是微调而不是蛮力使生产率提高，是市场的力量而不是政府干预能提升效率

谢国忠/文
 
　　散发着凯恩斯主义味道的流动性正在全球泛滥。市场共识已经由3月初的萧条，变成了现在的新一轮牛市。牛市判断，首先基于催生资产价格上涨的流动性，其次是公司和家庭部门资产负债表改善，最后是需求日益增加。这种在过去20年来一直奏效的“格林斯潘动力”，这次将会失灵。流动性泛滥将很快导致通货膨胀，阻碍刚刚萌芽的资产泡沫蓓蕾成长。
　　当反通胀的力量使通货膨胀下降、将流动性疏导进资产市场时，流动性是奏效的。不断上涨的资产价格会引起负债的需求，杠杆率的提高又会增加需求。资产市场驱动增长模型之所以奏效，是因为全球化和IT使通货膨胀处于可控范围内。当两者的收益被吸收掉，又看不到新的生产增长源时，流动性很快就会导致通货膨胀。
产能过剩不能拉低通胀
　　大多数分析者并不认为过剩产能会导致通胀，因为需求大幅下滑会使通货膨胀处在可控范围内。因此，在全球经济完全复苏之前，流动性激增不会成为问题。我认为，这种逻辑是错误的。金融市场通过商品投机活动，可以直接将通货膨胀作为流动性的疏导路径。尽管需求下滑，但是，石油价格已经接近春季低点的2倍了。这主要反映了金融需求的增加。增加的流动性已经流向了石油期货，这是由通胀预期驱动的。只凭20世纪70年代那样的预期，就能使流动性变成通胀。
　　过剩的产能并不能拉低通胀，原因有二。首先，和原材料相比，制造业增加值比以前要小很多。全球化驱使跨国公司将生产转移到中国这样的低成本国家。在这个过程中，制造环节的重要性已经下降。例如，尽管存在巨大的产能过剩，钢铁价格仍然随着铁矿石价格的变化而变化，因为铁矿石占到钢铁生产成本的一半以上，炼焦煤占了四分之一，设备折旧、劳动力成本和利润只占到产品价格的一小部分。
　　其次，许多过剩产能需要被淘汰，因为需求结构将发生变化。泡沫夸大了许多产业的需求，汽车、IT、金融服务表现得尤为突出。未来信贷不会那么廉价。汽车需求也会反映出这一点，产业可能收缩三分之一。
　　克莱斯勒破产是第一步，接下来可能是通用汽车公司。在泡沫鼎盛时期，金融部门的利润率被夸大1倍以上，这导致了骇人的IT基建费用支出。当金融部门收缩、利润率恢复正常时，即使全球需求复苏，IT需求也将比此前低很多。最后，金融部门不得不大幅收缩，可能达到50％。泡沫创造的需求不会再现。
　　过剩的产能会抑制通货膨胀的“宏大观点”，并不适用于现在。如果执意按此观点增加流动性，会将全球经济引向一条危险的道路。我曾预言，滞胀将会是2006年格林斯潘时代终结时的安魂曲。现在看来，世界没有任何抵抗地滑入了这条路径。在格林斯潘时代度过20年安逸生活后，政策制定者、市场和工人都想要一种简单的解决方法（“免费的午餐”的委婉说法），来走出经济下滑。“免费的午餐”可能违背经济逻辑，在特定时期出现。但是，这顿“午餐”持续时间越长，最终的调整就会变得越痛苦。
“网络效应”消耗殆尽
　　世界，尤其是中国，应该着眼于改革，而不是凯恩斯主义刺激计划的过度放纵。我已经撰文指出，中国需要通过财富再分配，将需求从出口转向家庭部门。在本文中，我想强调，中国需要着力提高效率。这是中国进入新一轮高速增长的必要条件。
　　在过去30多年里，中国经历了高速增长。好的政策组合是催化剂。但是，这是必要条件，而不是充分条件。20世纪八九十年代的低起点，为好政策发挥作用提供了充分的空间。低起点可以从工资水平、城市化率、出口能力等方面来理解。出口能力在需求方面一直占据主导地位。通过吸引制造业重新布局和建设支持性基础设施，中国出口年均增长率接近20％。但是，低起点效应在未来不再灵验；在大的经济体中，中国出口占GDP增长的份额是最高的。一些经济体出口占GDP的比重更高一些，是由于跨境运输零部件。
　　在供给方面，基础设施网络建设带来的规模经济，极大地提高了生产力。其中的关键是所谓的“网络效应”。修建高速公路，可以通过降低沿途的运输成本来提高效率。当建成网络时，单位投资带来的效率提高会按平方级增长，因为运输成本的降低从一点扩大至整个区域。在过去十年里，中国一直建设高速公路、电信、电力网络。网络建成时，由于生产成本降低，生产率得到极大提升。基础设施的发展与低工资一样，也是中国低成本的原因。
　　表现欠佳的中国企业（比如利润率低、缺乏知识产权之类的可持续资产）和强劲的宏观经济之间的冲突，让市场感到困惑。在20世纪90年代，大多数投资者认为，中国经济增长将很快崩溃，因为企业表现不佳。但是，这种情况并未发生，因为基础设施建设降低了生产成本、增加了出口竞争力。经济增长带来的好处，不成比例地进入了资产通货膨胀和政府收入。公司利润和工人工资并没能获得同样的改善。尽管微观表现不佳，基础设施带来的生产率提高，仍然是宏观经济持续向好的关键。
　　未来，提高生产率的难度将加大。中国基础设施网络已经形成。扩张并不能带来同样的收益。原因是网络最初带来的规模经济递增，最终会转化为规模经济递减。例如，高速公路的建设会减轻现有高速公路的拥堵，经济收益与投资是成比例的，但不会像第一次建高速公路网时那般呈现指数级增长。如果在一条并不拥堵的高速公路旁再修建一条，收益可能会少于投资。
　　经济学中，“规模经济”没有被透彻理解。标准的经济理论假设规模经济递减，比如，增加同样的投入，所得产出将减少。当公司扩张时，迟早会遇到协作的问题。我们经常听说公司因此而“瘦身”。在增长的早期，公司层面的协作不成问题，共享资源带来的优势很明显。因此，公司在成长初期表现为规模经济递增，在成熟期表现为规模经济递减。当经济理论论及经济活动的均衡状态时，规模经济递减是正确的假设。
　　网络的规模经济与公司层面的规模经济相似，只是更加强烈。在网络建设初期，经济收益与投资规模可能是线性的或者成比例的。当网络即将建成时，经济收益呈指数级增长。当一个完整的网络扩张时，收益相对于投资是下降的，比如，额外的每1美元投资只能得到更少的经济收益。
　　中国的基础设施投资是否已到收益递减阶段了？这很难说。但是，因为网络已经形成，效率比此前要低得多。由于基础设施带来的生产率提高放缓，需要找到一个其他来源来保持经济增长。
提高效率维持增长
　　现在中国的宏观经济政策由流动性主导，流动性注入企业和政府部门。理由是无论效率如何，更多的消费会使经济恢复；如果通过低效率的投资来达到同样的效果，会需要更多的消费。当然，如果没有什么不良后果，印钞票能解决任何经济问题：如果不奏效，只需再多印一些。但是，增加流动性或者印钞票会导致通货膨胀。投资效率越低，通货膨胀出现得越早。
　　中国有很大的机动空间：政府债务低，银行系统存贷款比例低，家庭部门杠杆率低。当然，公司部门的高杠杆值得担忧。国家有强大的购买力，这在巨额外汇储备和持续的贸易顺差中反映出来。如今可选择的办法，反映了过去在提高生产率和出口能力方面的成功。但是，这两方面都遇到了困难。因此，中国应该谨慎地将资金投向那些来未能带来收益的项目上，而不是投在仅仅能提高即期GDP的非生产性项目上。
　　即使中国有足够的财力，也应该谨慎花费，因为未来挣钱的难度加大了。很容易就能提高生产率和出口能力的日子，已经一去不复返了。因此，中国应该尽早收紧货币政策。在2008年12月至2009年4月五个月里，中国的银行信贷增长了20％。如果保持这一速度，信贷年增长率将达到50％。上一次信贷如此快速增长是在1992年，它导致了失控的通货膨胀。如果通货膨胀再次出现，将比上一次更难解决。上世纪90年代中期，中国实行紧缩货币政策以控制通胀时，出口的快速增长维持了经济增长。这次就没有那么幸运了。
　　如果通货膨胀出现而经济仍然低迷，政府可能不愿充分收紧来冷却通胀，这可能导致长时间的高通胀、低增长。对中国、美国和世界来讲，滞胀的风险很大。最初信贷激增对稳定经济是必要的，但是，持续下去可能带来更多的负面影响。为今年GDP多增长一两个百分点，甘冒出现恶性通货膨胀的风险，是不值得的。
　　在今年剩余的时间内，银行信贷应由非常宽松转向中性。中性意味着银行信贷与GDP的比率应该保持不变。例如，现在的银行信贷是37万亿元人民币，是GDP的1.2倍。如果名义GDP每月增加2000亿元，今年增长8％，那么，银行信贷应该每月增长2400亿元。4月新增贷款从此前四个月的月均1.4万亿元，下降到6400亿元，但相对中性的标准来讲，仍然太高。货币收紧还有很长的路要走。
　　在我看来，中国应该更多地着眼于提高供应方的效率，来保持高增长。未来十年里，全球经济增长很可能比过去慢很多。中国需要更高的效率，才能达到同样的增速。效率的提高不能依赖固定资产扩张。过去的问题是规模小，设备陈旧。现在，这两点都不再是问题，中国大部分工业似乎都是装备精良，但苦于产能过剩。
　　今后，效率的提高是一个系统或者激励问题，而不是投资问题。因为是微调而不是蛮力使生产率提高，是市场的力量而不是政府干预能提升效率。
　　许多人认为，美国和发达国家发生的事情，表现出了市场经济坏的一面，因此，中国不应该再朝市场经济发展。这是从当前的金融危机中得出的错误结论。市场仍然是激发企业用最低的成本交付最好的产品的最好工具。其他所有的体制都已经在促进繁荣上失败了。然而，市场要正常运转，也需要监管。比如，需要有食品安全标准，确保行业正常发展。监管的主要目的，应该是使市场更有效率地运转，而不是取代市场。
　　一些经济体，像美国、英国，十年前过多地放松了管制，为当前的危机埋下了隐患。中国经济则是被政府过度监管和控制。当前危机的教训对中国的政策走向没有意义，中国的市场要变成“太自由”，还有很长的路要走。
　　现在过多的流动性刺激，可能导致今后的通货膨胀。对中国来讲，是放慢货币供应的时候了。政策着眼点应该转向扩大家庭部门的消费，提升供应方的效率。否则，在接下来的数年里，中国将要承受低增长和高通胀。■
　　作者为《财经》杂志特约经济学家、玫瑰石顾问公司董事
　　此文英文原文见《财经网》英文版http://english.caijing.com.cn/economist/

 

Efficiency's Urgent Cry for Attention05-25 06:47 Caijing  comments( 0 )
China's economy has squeezed a lot of growth out of liquidity, exports and new infrastructure. It's time to embrace efficiency.
 
By Andy Xie, guest economist to Caijing and a board member of Rosetta Stone Advisors Ltd.

(Caijing Magazine) The world is awash in Keynesian liquidity. Market consensus shifted in early March from depression mode to today's bull market. The case for a new bull run was built, first of all, on liquidity pumping up asset prices, followed by improvements in corporate and household balance sheets, and finally on rising demand.

This is a Greenspan dynamic that worked for the past 20 years. But it won't work this time. This flood of liquidity soon will lead to inflation, nipping the nascent asset bubble in the bud.

Liquidity works when a disinflationary force holds down inflation and channels liquidity into asset markets. Rising asset prices lead to debt demand. Higher leverage increases demand. This asset market-led growth model worked in the past because globalization and IT development kept inflation in check. As the upside from both has been absorbed, and no other source of production growth is in sight, liquidity will soon lead to inflation.

Most analysts argue against inflation on grounds that excess capacity due to slumping demand will keep inflation in check. Hence, they say, the liquidity boom won't be a problem until the global economy has fully recovered. I think this is faulty logic. Financial markets can channel liquidity directly into inflation through commodity speculation.

Despite declining oil demand, for example, prices have nearly doubled from their lows this past spring. This mainly reflects rising financial demand; a rising amount of liquidity has flowed into oil futures, which is being powered by expectations of inflation. As in the 1970s, these expectations alone are capable of turning liquidity into inflation.

Rising labor activism is another source of inflation. Most think labor unions are no longer an important force because their influence has waned over the past three decades. I think labor union power is driven by demand rather than supply. During an economic boom, few are interested in supporting labor unions. But in hard times, workers are more supportive of unions.

Globalization drove the boom during the past quarter-century. The bottom half of income earners in developed countries did not share this income growth; their wages stagnated through the boom. However, they benefited from rising property prices and easy credit conditions. They improved their living standards by borrowing -- running up credit card debt, paying minimum down payments for autos and property, and running up debt against rising property prices.

The pacification of globalization's losers is coming to an end. Creditors now know the risks and will no longer lend like before. When credit cards stop working, labor unions are likely to come back, demanding wage increases.

Excess capacity won't hold down inflation for two reasons. First, manufacturing value-added is much lower than it was before relative to raw material costs. Globalization has forced multinationals to shift production to low-cost countries such as China. In the process, manufacturing has decreased in importance. For example, steel prices are moving in tandem with iron ore prices, despite huge processing overcapacity. The reason is that iron ore accounts for more than half the cost of production. Coking coal is another quarter of the cost. Equipment depreciation, labor, and profits account for small shares of product price.

Second, much of the overcapacity needs to be scrapped because demand won't recover to yesterday's levels. The bubble exaggerated demand in many industries. Automobile, IT and financial services stand out in this regard. Credit won't be as cheap in the future. Auto demand will reflect that. The industry may shrink by one-third.

The bankruptcy of Chrysler was the first step. GM may be next. Profitability in the financial sector was exaggerated by more than 100 percent at the bubble's peak, leading to outrageous capital expenditures for IT. As the financial sector shrinks and profitability normalizes, IT demand will remain at much lower levels, even as global demand recovers. Finally, the financial sector has to shrink enormously, possibly by up to 50 percent. That bubble-inspired demand simply won't be back.

The macro concept of excess capacity as a check against inflation will not work this time. Pumping in liquidity while relying on this flimsy concept would lead the global economy down a dangerous path. I expected stagflation as an end-game for the Greenspan era in 2006. It seems the world is sliding down this path without any resistance. After two decades of easy living during the Greenspan era, policymakers, markets and workers all want an easy solution -- a euphemism for a free lunch -- as a way out of an economic downturn. A free lunch may seem likely during special periods, defying economic logic. But the longer a free lunch lasts, the more pain will be inflicted during the inevitable adjustment.

Instead of overindulging in Keynesian stimuli, the world -- especially China -- should focus on reform. I have written on the need for China to shift demand from the export sector to households through wealth redistribution. For example, distributing the shares of state-owned enterprises evenly among the Chinese population would spark a decade-long economic boom. But we should also focus on improving efficiency -- a necessary condition for a new high growth cycle in China.

China has experienced high growth for the past three decades. Good policy mix was the catalyst. But that was a necessary, not sufficient, condition. Starting from a low base in the 1980s and '90s gave good policy ample room for effectiveness. The low base could be understood in terms of wage levels, urbanization or export penetration.

The last element has played the dominant role on the demand side. By convincing manufacturers to relocate while building support infrastructure, China's exports achieved a nearly 20 percent annual growth rate. The low base effect, however, will no longer apply in the future. In terms of the share of GDP in value-added, China's exports are now by far the largest in the world among large economies, although some economies have larger export-to-GDP ratios due to cross-border shipping of parts and components.

On the supply side, economies of scale linked to infrastructure network construction gave an enormous boost to productivity. The key was the so-called network effect. Building a highway improves efficiency by decreasing transportation costs along the route. Building a network squares efficiency per unit of investment by lowering the cost of transporting goods from one point throughout an entire area. China built highway, telecom and electricity networks for the first time over the past decade. As networks were completed, productivity improved enormously by lowering production costs. China's low costs were as much due to low wages as infrastructure development.

In the past, the market was puzzled by what seemed to be a conflict in China marked by strong macroeconomic performance despite poorly performing businesses (such as firms with low profitability and few sustainable assets, such as intellectual property rights). In the 1990s, most investors thought China's growth would fall apart quickly due to underperforming businesses. That didn't happen because benefits from infrastructure development spread through the economy by decreasing production costs and boosting export competitiveness. The upside from economic growth went disproportionately into asset inflation and government revenues. Corporate profits and labor income didn't benefit as much. The productivity gains from infrastructure development were critical to sustaining good macro, despite bad micro.

Productivity gains in the future will be more difficult. China's infrastructure networks have been formed. Expansion won't generate the same gains. The reason is that rising economies of scale when new networks are being built eventually turn into diminishing economies of scale. For example, if one builds a highway to alleviate congestion on an existing highway, the economic benefit is proportional to the investment. If one builds a highway next to one that's not congested, the benefit is probably less than the investment. Only when a highway is built for the first time is the benefit exponential.

Economies of scale are not well understood by economists. Standard economic theory assumes diminishing economies of scale, i.e. more of the same leads to less output. When a company expands, it runs into coordination problems sooner or later. We frequently hear stories of corporate slimming for that reason. At an early growth stage, coordination at the company level is not a problem, while the advantages of shared resources are significant. Hence, a company exhibits increasing economies of scale during its early development and diminishing economies of scale when it matures. As economic theory deals with state of equilibrium in economic activities, it's correct to assume diminishing economies of scale.

Network economies of scale are similar to those at the company level, but with more intensity. When a network construction project is just beginning, its economic benefit is probably linear or proportionate to the investment scale. When a network is about to be completed, its economic benefit grows exponentially. When a completed network expands, the benefit diminishes relative to investment, i.e. every additional dollar of investment gets less economic benefit.

Has China's infrastructure investment reached the point of diminishing return? It's hard to say. But investment's effectiveness is much less than in the past because networks have been completed. As there will be fewer productivity gains from infrastructure, productivity gains are needed from elsewhere to maintain the same economic growth momentum.

China's macro policy is now being dominated by the pumping of liquidity into business and government sectors. The argument is that spending more will bring the economy back, regardless of efficiency, and that what's needed are the same results with less efficient investment. Of course, if there are no negative consequences, printing money would solve any economic problem: If something's not working, just print more. However, boosting liquidity and printing money lead to inflation. The less efficient the investment, the earlier inflation arrives. As I have elaborated before, inflation could infect the system more easily now that the benefits of globalization and IT have been absorbed.

China has a lot of room to maneuver: The government's debt level is low, the banking system's loan deposit ratio is low, and household leverage is low. A high leverage level in the corporate sector is a worry. But the country has excellent spending power overall reflected in a large foreign exchange reserve and persistent trade surplus.

Today's options reflect past successes in achieving productivity gains and export penetration. Both stories are running into barriers. Hence, China should spend money carefully to nurse existing golden gooses into the future, and not steer money into unproductive, white elephant projects to pump up GDP today. China should spend carefully even though it can spend more, because money won't come as easily in the future. The days of easy productivity gains and export penetration are over.

This is why China should tighten its monetary policy as soon as possible. Between December 2008 and April 2009, China's bank lending rose by 20 percent. If the current pace is maintained, the annual loan growth would reach 50 percent. Lending hasn't risen this rapidly since 1992. The result that year was rampant inflation. If inflation becomes a problem again, tackling it will be more difficult. In the mid-1990s, China tightened policy to contain inflation while exports rose rapidly to maintain economic growth. The same lucky scenario is unlikely to be repeated this time.

If inflation surfaces while the economy remains sluggish, the government may not be willing to tighten down sufficiently to cool inflation. It may lead to a prolonged period of high inflation rates and sluggish growth. This risk of stagflation is quite significant for China, the United States, and the world. While the initial burst in lending was needed to stabilize the economy, its continuation may carry more negatives than positives. It is not worth risking virulent inflation merely for a gain of one or two more percentage points in this year's GDP growth rate.

Bank lending should switch from extremely expansionary to neutral for the remainder of the year. Neutral means the bank loan/GDP ratio should remain the same. For example, the current loan stock is 37 trillion yuan, or 1.2 times GDP. If nominal GDP grows by 200 billion yuan per month, or 8 percent for the year, bank lending should grow by 240 billion yuan per month. Lending in April cooled to 640 billion yuan from an average of 1.4 trillion yuan for the previous four months. It is still too high relative to the neutral level. Monetary tightening has a long way to go.

China should focus more on improving supply side efficiency to sustain high growth. The global economy is likely to be much slower over the next decade than in the past. China has to be much more efficient to achieve the same growth rate. But efficiency improvement in the future cannot rely on fixed asset expansion. Small facilities and old equipment are no longer problems. Most of China's industries seem to have state-of-the-art equipment but suffer from excess capacity.

Efficiency improvement in the future is less an investment issue than systemic or incentive issues. Because fine-tuning rather than brutal force must drive productivity growth, market forces rather than government intervention should drive efficiency.

Many now argue that what's happened in the United States and in developed economies shows the bad side of the market economy and, hence, China should not continue moving toward the market. This is drawing the wrong conclusion from the current crisis. The market remains the best tool for motivating businesses to deliver the best products at the lowest possible prices. All other systems have failed to deliver prosperity. Markets, however, need regulations to function properly. For example, food safety standards need to be in place for that industry to function properly. The main purpose of regulation should be to encourage more efficient market functioning, not replace the market.

Some economies such as those in the United States and Britain deregulated too much a decade ago, laying the foundation for today's crisis. China's economy, however, is excessively regulated and controlled by the government. The lesson from today's crisis has little bearing on China's policy forward. China still has a long way to go before its market is "too free."

Excessive liquidity stimuli today may lead to inflation and economic chaos in the future. It's time for China to rein in its money supply. The policy focus should shift toward promoting household demand and supply side efficiency. Otherwise, China could suffer from low growth and high inflation for years to come.

Full Article in Chinese: http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2009-05-24/110170566.html