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[此贴子已经被nie于2005-10-8 19:35:28编辑过]
baiming提供 博弈论（[美]弗登博格等著）
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=3798&page=1#pid18844
wwwkkk8002 弗登伯格：《博弈学习理论》密码:123 上次忘告诉大家了,见凉,现在大家可以学习了
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=37283&page=1#pid220804
mtex Thomas S. Ferguson的博弈论教材 Thomas S. Ferguson的博弈论教材，全书，英文版，University of California的研究生指定教材，博弈论专家评论，此书可与吉本斯的媲美，但内容和难度比之要大一些，好的话，请回一个贴
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=48774&page=1#pid292778
煜吉本斯《博弈论基础》课后习题答案（第2章、第3－4章打包）
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=32536&page=1#pid195514
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=32644&page=1#pid196018
igaveup Gibbons第一章习题答案 https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=34337&page=1#pid203330
herzberg 张维迎 《博弈论与信息经济学》https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=39915&page=1#pid236964
sunmq 经济博弈论 谢识予（第二版）pdf格式 https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=47008&page=1#pid280821
Jaguar R Gibbons_博弈论基础(中文版)
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=16616&page=1#pid100797
gaojizu 奥斯本的博弈论答案https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=30026&page=1#pid183923
| water1982提供 经济博弈论 （第二版） |
| 作者： 谢识予编著 出版社：复旦大学出版社 出版日期：2002年1月第2版 页数：393 |
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=3798&page=1#pid18844
[此贴子已经被作者于2005-11-11 21:50:49编辑过]
Eric Rasmusen博弈论与信息（英文版）感谢lxd6808友情提供。
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=14065&page=1#pid83271
[此贴子已经被河塘月色于2006-5-18 13:45:28编辑过]
吉本斯《博弈论基础》整体中文版 感谢网友akicie
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=48053&page=1#pid288159
基本斯《应用博弈论导轮》感谢网友ausman
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=12712&page=1#pid73031
博弈论与信息经济学 张维迎 感谢网友lshf1977_0
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=65241&page=1#pid409120
奥斯本、鲁宾斯坦《博弈论教程》感谢dayu0001
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=2603&page=1#pid13505
Solution manual for "a course in game theory" by Osborne and Rubinstein 感谢网友adaadaada
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=32567&page=1#pid195702
Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium -- Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games 感谢网友Socrates
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=41878&page=1#pid248873
EricRasmusen博弈与信息(第三版)-博弈论导论 感谢网友shishangbeida
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=37814&page=1#pid224164
https://bbs.pinggu.org/topicadmin.php?action=xiuzheng
[此贴子已经被作者于2006-5-18 13:47:43编辑过]
Game Theory Evolving by Herbert Gintis 感谢网友dyodingo
The study of strategic action (game theory) is moving from a formal science of rational behavior to an evolutionary tool kit for studying behavior in a broad array of social settings. In this problem-oriented introduction to the field, Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human (and even animal) behavior.
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=64997&page=1#pid407561
博弈论教程(马丁J.奥斯本)中文版 感谢rhapsody
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=21761&page=1#pid135370
Game Theory And Economic Analysis: A Quiet Revolution In Economics 感谢网友ypk9999
Edited By Christian Schmidt
First published in French in 1995 as Théorie des jeux et analyse économique 50 ans après (special issue of Revue d’Economie Politique, 1995, no. 4, pp. 529–733) by Éditions Dalloz
This edition published 2002 by Routledge
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=62632&page=1#pid393070
[此贴子已经被作者于2006-5-18 13:48:33编辑过]
Game theory and Industrial Organization 感谢网友孙悟空
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=32489&page=1#pid194200
拉斯缪森：《博弈与信息》
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=47266&page=1#pid282647感谢zhouxu23
《身边的博弈论：博弈论与信息经济学浅说》感谢网友清风明月7744
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=62087&page=1#pid389543
谢识予的经济博弈论课后习题答案 感谢网友index2008
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=17311&page=1#pid104789
博弈论：矛盾冲突分析_迈尔森
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=2313&page=1#pid11792
博弈算法全集 感谢网友huhuaping01
剪枝算法
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=38311&page=1#pid226939
局面描述
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=38311&page=1#pid226939
[此贴子已经被作者于2006-2-7 14:48:55编辑过]
《百卷经济全书》为人民出版社出版
顾问:刘国光 高尚全 王梦奎
主编：胡晓林 龚莉
副主编：顾海良 姚开健
国务院副总理 邹家华 作序
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内容提要
本书介绍了在经济活动和管理工作中所必备的运筹学方法。运筹学方法是寻求最佳经济管理决策的重要方法之一。书中通过大量的应用实例，全面、新颖、简洁、明了地介绍了八部分内容，其中包括经济资源最优配置的线性规划间题;物资调运问题;经济变量为整数条件下的规划问题;具有多种经济目标的规划间题;网络最大流问题;库存控制问题;排队服务系统的最优协调问题;高效率的选优问题等。本书突出了知识性、教程性、资料性、工具性、普及性等特点，它最适合作为自学教程、业务培训教材、企业工具书以及广长或经理室藏书等。通过学习:可提高决策者作出正确决策的能力，也可供实际经济管理工作者参考使用。
46484.zip
本附件包括：
[此贴子已经被作者于2006-4-1 2:15:42编辑过]
Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006
Games and Information continues to do well despite the continued flow of books on
game theory and industrial organization, and the arrival of a number of specialized books
on topics such as contracting and auctions. I’ve had emails from readers in Canada, Chile,
China, Dubai, Germany, Great Britain, India, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Korea, Malaysia, Man,
Mexico, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, and the United States. This encourages
me to think a new edition would be worthwhile, incorporating, especially, new models
and ways to organize thoughts for the the material on asymmetric information in the second
half of the book. I have also added more homework problems, and fourteen classroom
games, one at the end of each chapter.
Besides the specific changes mentioned below, I have made minor changes throughout
the book. I have, for example, renamed the strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma from
Deny and Confess to Silence and Blame. The new terms are less conventional, but they
do avoid avoid the confusion in the abbreviations C and D with Cooperate and Defect,
two other commonly used terms I dislike because they invite confusion with cooperative
games and deviations in strategies. This is an illustration of how I have tried to think of
writing up the material in this book.
The chapters that have been most changed are Chapters 10 (Mechanisms), 13 (Auctions),
and 14 (Pricing), but there is also new material in other chapters.
Chapter 3 (Mixed Strategies) now has material on Bertrand equilibrium and strategic
substitutes and complements formerly in Chapter 14 and material on patent races formerly
in Chapter 15. It has a new section on existence of equilibrium, and an example of how a
pure strategy can be strictly dominated by a mixed strategy.
Chapter 7 (Moral Hazard I) has a discussion of quasilinear utility functions and the
iii
effect of changes in bargaining power.
Chapter 8 (Moral Hazard II) has a new section on Holmstrom & Milgrom’s 1991 idea
of multitask agency, in which the agent uses more than one kind of effort and generates
multiple outputs, only one of which can be well measured.
Chapter 9 (Adverse Selection) has a new version of the Production Game to illustrate
the combination of moral hazard with adverse selection.
Chapter 10 (Mechanisms) also has a new version of the Production Game, used to
illustrate mechanism design and the new topic of the Maskin matching scheme. I have
added a section on the Sender-Receiver game of Crawford and Sobel. I’ve cut back on the
treatment of Myerson’s Trading Game, giving just one version instead of three. In general, I
have tried to make the notation and analysis of this chapter more uniform, putting special
emphasis on the standard outcome that the bad type’s participation constraint and the
good type’s incentive compatibility constraints are binding. I have moved away from the
term “moral hazard with hidden knowledge” in favor of the more direct “post- contractual
hidden knowledge”.
Chapter 11 (Signalling) contains the new topic of countersignalling (introduced in
Feltovich, Harbaugh & To [2002]), under which middle-quality types signal, but the best
types deliberately do not, instead relying on other means of conveying their type. I have
also replaced the 3rd editions’s model of limit pricing as signal jamming with a new, simpler
model.
Chapter 13 (Auctions) is the most drastically changed, by far. In earlier editions the
treatment of auctions was relatively nontechnical because I wished to avoid the difficult
task of trying to convey that intricate but unified literature in the simplified but formal
style of the rest of the book. By now, however, enough new treatments of the old material
has appeared for the unities in auction theory to be presented more simply, and so I’ve
made the chapter much longer, and technical. This allows me to add topics such as all- pay
auctions, proof of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, the marginal-revenue interpetation of
reserve prices, a formal model comparing different auction rules in a common-value auction,
Klemperer’s Wallet Game, affiliation, and linkage.
Chapter 14 (Pricing) has a section on vertical quality differentiation, by a monopolist
and by a duopoly, which also allows discussion of “crimping the product”.
I have dropped Chapter 15 (Entry), though it remains available at the website. Its
topics had no technical unity, and while they served well as examples of techniques from
earlier chapters, I decided that they contained enough examples, especially as new editions
have been increasing the number of models in those earlier chapters.
博弈论导引 英文原版 j_chch提供
https://bbs.pinggu.org/viewthread.php?tid=92667&page=1#pid567110
下载《GAME THEORY AT WORK》
全名为《GAME THEORY AT WORK：How to Use Game Theory to Outthink and Outmaneuver Your Competition》，英文版,可粘贴的那种版本，超清晰，作者为James D. Miller[美]，已经有中文版了，翻译的中文名为《活学活用博弈论－如何利用博弈论在竞争中获胜》。急用钱，便宜买了。
中文版内容提要：
我们常常被博弈论著作中大量的数学模型吓倒。其实，博弈论不是学者们用来唬人的把戏，而是一种一般性的分析方法。读过本书之后，相信你再也不会认为博弈论是一门远离自己身边事情的有效方法。
本书用每个人都能理解的语言详细、准确且全面地讲解了博弈论的分析方法及其在现实中的各种应用。对于2005年诺贝尔经济学奖得主奥曼和谢林的理论，本书也有详细的介绍。例如，对谢林在分析社会冲突时得出的一些有用的策略——加薪威胁、交出控制权以及切断联系等，本书用简明的语言进行了讲解，而对于奥曼的重复博弈，本书则是用通俗的例子加以说明。
这里有一些中文版的评语：
在我们身边常常会出现一些看似矛盾的现象：在商战中，许多人展示的诚实，并不是基于道德，而是由于贪婪；不为自己留退路的选择可以提高我们的收益；企业烧钱可以增加财富；进行短线投机的人也会关注股价的长期趋势；要求加薪时，使自己陷入可能的难堪境地，能够增加自己的谈判力；有精神问题的人比心智健全的同事更具谈判优势。这些问题正是博弈论学者，包括2005年诺贝尔经济学奖得主奥曼和谢林研究的问题。如果能抛开博弈论中艰深的数学分析，我们就可以很轻松地理解这些现象背后的博弈论原理，并将这些策略应用在我们的生活与工作中。本书以通俗易懂的语言和大量实例讲解了博弈论的理论及其在日常生活和商业领域的应用，读者不需要研究晦涩的数学模型，就可以准确地把握博弈论的精髓，并利用这一工具使自己在竞争激烈的社会环境中立于不败之地。与《孙子兵法》一样，博弈论的应用并不限于某一领域，只要是存在合作、竞争与对抗，博弈论方法就可以发挥效力。因而博弈论应该成为我们每个人在制定决策是的基本思考工具。 ...
Contents：
1 Introduction 1
2 Threats, Promises, and Sequential Games 7
3 The Dangers of Price Competition 43
4 Simultaneous Games 51
5 Massive Coordination Games 85
6 Nash Equilibria 101
7 Prisoners’ Dilemma 115
8 Adverse Selection 151
9 Surviving with Limited Information 163
10 Price Discrimination and Other Pricing Strategies 183
11 Holdups 195
12 Spending Other People’s Money 207
13 Managing Employees 223
14 Negotiations 241
15 Auctions 249
16 The Stock Market 257
17 Further Readings and References 265
Appendix: Study Questions 271
Notes 293
Index 299
博弈论（[美]弗登博格等著）英文版
共19个
part1
part2
part3
part13
part14
prat15
part16
part17
part18
part19
[此贴子已经被河塘月色于2006-11-12 13:38:32编辑过]
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