• Paperback: 288 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (October 11, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0199283915
• ISBN-13: 978-0199283910

Editorial Reviews        Review
  
"How candemocratic competition make a government of politicians act as agovernment for the people? Tim Besley has given us a broad and deepanalysis of this fundamental agency problem which is essential to thetheory of democracy. This is an important book for anyone who wants tostudy political science with the best analytical tools of moderneconomics."--Roger Myerson, William C. Norby Professor of Economics,University of Chicago
"How does the structure of democraticpolitical institutions and organization shape policy choice? Thispath-breaking book boldly claims that well-designed institutions canhelp voters select politicians who are 'better:' more capable and morefaithful to the fiduciary duties of public life. Novel in its emphasison information, this unprecedentedly careful, thorough analysis of the'agency' problem links voters' ability to screen out bad politiciansand discipline rent-seeking with the competence, motivation, andalignment of politicians' preferences to explain a wide variety ofpolitical economy and public finance outcomes including debtaccumulation, the size and scope of government activities, corruption,and political turnover."--James E. Alt, Frank G. Thomson Professor ofGovernment, Harvard University
"A wonderful and important book,that combines state of the art analysis and deep knowledge of realworld institutions to obtain novel insights about a fundamental issue.It should be read by all those who want to understand what it is thatbrings about good government."--Guido Tabellini, Professor ofEconomics, Bocconi University
"Tim Besley demonstrates how toanalyze political agency in the intellectual middle ground left open inbetween the optimism of the traditional welfare-economics approach, andthe pessimism of the traditional public-choice approach. The key togood government is institution design- in the best Federalisttradition- to improve incentives in policymaking and selection topublic office. Quite simply, a great book by a greateconomist."--Torsten Persson, Director of the Institute forInternational Economic Studies
  

      Product Description
What is good government?Why do some governments fail ? How do you implement politicalaccountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in placeto ensure that politicians and public servants act in the publicinterest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressedin Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Economic analyses ofgovernment usually divide into two broad camps. One which emphasizesgovernment as a force for public good that can regulate markets,distribute resources and generally work towards improving the lives ofits citizens. The other sees government as driven by private interests,susceptible to those with the power to influence its decisions andfailing to incentivize its officials to act for the greater publicgood. This book adopts a middle way between the two extremes, thePublius approach, which recognizes the potential for government to actfor the public good but also accepts the fact that things often gowrong. It shares the view that there are certain institutionalpreconditions for effective government but then proceed to examineexactly what those preconditions are. Timothy Besley emphasises that itis not just about designing an appropriate institutional framework butalso about understanding the way incentives work and the process bywhich the political class is selected.