英文文献：Schools of Fishermen: A Theory of Information Sharing in Spatial Search-渔民学派:空间搜索中的信息共享理论
英文文献作者：Lynham, John
英文文献摘要：
Fishermen who compete for a resource in an open access setting generally do not share information amongst each other about where stocks are located. On the other hand, in fisheries where there are established property rights or fishing cooperatives, fishermen tend to share information with each other. Recent work in developing spatial models of fishermen behavior has generally ignored the effect that sharing information about where stocks are located can have. We develop a behavioral model of search amongst spatial resource harvesters that allows for varying degrees of information sharing. We demonstrate that informational cascades may lead to extremely inefficient spatial search by fishermen that do not share information and that this inefficiency may be persistent over time. We define a new parameter, information-dependent catchability, which captures the degree to which information sharing improves the efficiency of spatial search. We argue that institutions change the incentives to share information; information-dependent catchability will differ within a fishery depending on the specific management institutions adopted. This leads to theoretical predictions which depart from standard models but account for a wider range of field observations. In particular, we derive the conditions under which closing access to a fishery would have such a drastic impact on the incentives to share information (and hence, the efficiency of search) that total effort in the fishery will be unaffected by restricting access. We derive the equivalent conditions for steady state harvest and stock levels. Furthermore, we make an important distinction between Property Rights Rents and Information Sharing Rents (economic rents that can be attributed solely to changes in information-sharing). The shiroebi shrimp fishery in Shinminato, Japan provides an ideal natural experiment to test the impact of information sharing. Field observations from this fishery strongly accord with the predictions of the model presented in this paper.

在开放存取环境中竞争资源的渔民通常不会彼此分享鱼群所在位置的信息。另一方面，在已确立产权或渔业合作社的渔业中，渔民往往彼此分享信息。最近在开发渔民行为的空间模型方面的工作通常忽略了分享鱼群位置信息可能产生的影响。我们开发了一个在空间资源采集器之间搜索的行为模型，允许不同程度的信息共享。我们证明，信息级联可能会导致不共享信息的渔民空间搜索效率极低，而且这种低效率可能会持续一段时间。我们定义了一个新的参数信息依赖的捕捉能力，它反映了信息共享对空间搜索效率的提高程度。我们认为制度改变了分享信息的动机;根据所采用的具体管理机构，依赖信息的捕捉能力在渔业范围内将有所不同。这导致理论预测偏离了标准模型，但解释了更广泛的实地观察。特别地，我们推导出了一些条件，在这些条件下，关闭某一渔场的准入会对共享信息的激励(因此，搜索效率)产生如此巨大的影响，以至于渔业的全部努力将不受限制准入的影响。我们推导了稳定状态下收获和库存水平的等价条件。此外，我们还对产权租金和信息共享租金(仅可归因于信息共享的变化的经济租金)进行了重要区分。日本新港市的shiroebi虾渔业为测试信息共享的影响提供了一个理想的自然实验。该渔场的实地观察结果与本文提出的模型的预测非常一致。