Yuliy Sannikov教授10月28日至11月6日《公司财务》课程预告 中国经济与管理研究院 Yuliy Sannikov教授10月28日-11月6日 《公司财务》课程预告 普林斯顿大学经济系教授Yuliy Sannikov将于2009年10月28日-11月6日在中国经济与管理研究院讲授《公司财务》(Corporate Finance) 课程，请中国经济与管理研究院各年级研究生做好准备，同时也欢迎本校其他院系以及其他高校感兴趣的师生免费参加。 课程简介： This short course focuses on informational problems in corporate finance and includes topics such as contracts, capital structure and financial intermediation, with some connections to the business cycle. The goal is to develop modeling skills and understanding of how results are derived from assumptions. There will be in-class group problem-solving exercises to understand the papers better. Also the second week will include several student presentations (see papers marked by ‘*’below). The overall objective is to develop theoretical research skills. 阅读书目： The Irrelevance of Capital Structure 1. Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958) “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,” American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jun., 1958), pp. 261-297 Asymmetric Information and Signaling 2. Ross, S. (1977) “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signaling Approach,” Bell Journal of Economics 3. Leland, H. and Pyle, D. (1977) “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Finance 4. Myers, S. and Majluf, N. (1984) “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors do not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics 5. DeMarzo, P. and D. Duffie (1999) “A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design” Econometrica Financial Intermediation and the Business Cycle 6. Townsend, R. (1979) “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification,” Journal of Economic Theory * 7. Diamond, D. (1984) “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,” Review of Economic Studies. * 8. Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig (1983) “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity,” Journal of Political Economy 9. Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M. (1989) “Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations,American Economic Review. * 10. Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997a) ``Credit Cycles’’, Journal of Political Economy 11. Brunnermeier, M. and Y. Sannikov (2009) “A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector,” working paper Dynamics of Conflicts between Debt and Equity 12. Leland H. (1994) “Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance Incentives and Moral Hazard 13. Bolton, P. and Sharfstein, D. (1990) “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting,” American Economic Review 14. DeMarzo P. and Y. Sannikov (2006) “Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model,” Journal of Finance * 15. Edmans, Gabaix, Sannikov and Sadzik (2009) “Dynamic Incentive Accounts.”