英文文献：Demand and Welfare Analysis in Discrete Choice Models with Social Interactions-离散选择模型的需求和福利分析与社会互动
英文文献作者：Debopam Bhattacharya,Pascaline Dupas,Shin Kanaya
英文文献摘要：
Many real-life settings of consumer-choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover-effects. This paper develops novel empirical tools for analyzing demand and welfare-effects of policy-interventions in binary choice settings with social interactions. Examples include subsidies for healthproduct adoption and vouchers for attending a high-achieving school. We establish the connection between econometrics of large games and Brock-Durlauf-type interaction models, under both I.I.D. and spatially correlated unobservables. We develop new convergence results for associated beliefs and estimates of preference-parameters under increasing-domain spatial asymptotics. Next, we show that even with fully parametric specifications and unique equilibrium, choice data, that are sufficient for counterfactual demand - prediction under interactions, are insufficient for welfare-calculations. This is because distinct underlying mechanisms producing the same interaction coefficient can imply different welfare-effects and deadweightloss from a policy-intervention. Standard index-restrictions imply distribution-free bounds on welfare. We illustrate our results using experimental data on mosquito-net adoption in rural Kenya.

现实生活中，消费者选择的许多场景都涉及到社会互动，导致目标政策产生溢出效应。本文开发了新的实证工具来分析二元选择环境下的政策干预的需求和福利效应。例如，为采用健康产品提供补贴，并为进入成绩优异的学校提供代金券。我们建立了大型博弈的计量经济学和布洛克-杜洛夫型交互模型之间的联系，在I.I.D.和空间相关的不可观测值下。在空间渐近递增的情况下，给出了相关置信值和优选参数估计的收敛结果。接下来，我们表明，即使有完全参数规格和唯一均衡，选择数据，在交互作用下对反事实的需求预测是充分的，对福利计算是不够的。这是因为产生相同相互作用系数的不同基础机制可能意味着不同的政策干预的福利效应和无谓损失。标准的指数限制意味着福利的无分配界限。我们使用肯尼亚农村蚊帐采用的实验数据来说明我们的结果。