| [摘要] 非常强劲的增长之后，2004年下半年和2005年初，由于产出开始碰到生产能力的约束，世界经济减速。高油价侵蚀了石油进口国的收入，但这种扩张依然是强劲的，部分是由于金融市场的有利条件，包括依然较低的通货膨胀、低利率和较窄的利率差。石油市场的紧张，甚至高燃料价格的威胁及利率可能提高的可能性，是这种扩张所面临的主要威胁。 减速但依然强劲的增长 2005年世界GDP估计增长3.2%，低于2004年的3.8%。2006年的增长预计将是平稳的，2007年将会有所强化。始于2004年下半年的这种减速出现在整个工业化世界，欧洲的增长依然低于其潜在增长能力。相反，美国和日本的经济尽管也放慢了，但仍然接近于其最大的可持续速度。 在大型发展中国家经济体中，2005年，中国和印度的GDP将继续快速增长（分别在9%以上和7%左右），但俄罗斯由于石油生产疲软而有所放慢。高油价加上国内生产能力约束及来自高收入国家的进口需求趋缓，将使进口石油的发展中国家的增长从6.9%下降到6.1%。实际收入计算，这种放慢将会急剧得多，从6.4%下降到3.7%。尽管石油收入在增长，但石油部门增加产量的可能性减少也意味着，出口石油的发展中国家的产出增长也会减速，从6.6%降到5.6%。 2006年间，高收入国家的增长预计与平稳的，大约为2.5%，2007年会有所回升。其原因是，欧洲的表现有所改善，美国和日本将出现稳定增长。在美国，高油价和趋紧的货币政策有望抵消过去的贬值对增长的积极效应。预测欧洲将会出现回升，尽管高油价会对增长产生负面影响，这种影响可能会超出低利率的抵消作用，从而会抑制投资需求，而欧元事实上的升值所带来的负面效果大多数外被消散。在日本，尽管有高油价强化了的国有需求和扶持性的宏观经济政策将能使增长继续接近于其潜力。 发展中经济体的增长预测将会从2005年估计的5.9%温和下降至2007年的5.5%。在东亚和南亚，增长预计会有所回落，但仍然非常强劲，尤其是中国和印度。在中东和北非和萨哈拉以南非洲，强劲的石油收入将会支撑石油出口国的国内需求，部分地抵消将会放慢生产增长的能力约束。拉美和加勒比地区的经济预计将会放慢，主要是由于石油之外的初级商品价格疲软，若干国家经历了2004年非常强劲的增长之后出现回调。在欧洲和中亚，加入欧盟和石油生产国面临产能约束之后增长红利的减少，将使其经济增长出现一定放慢。 紧俏的商品市场 放慢的全球增长将会减弱石油之外的初级商品市场的紧张。已经出现了稳定的迹象，农产品价格甚至出现了下滑迹象，在这个领域，供应已经对高价格作出了反应。金属和海运价格也出现了下调的迹象，尽管幅度较小。 在石油市场，预测的增长减速不足以导致价格的大幅度回调。原油供应增长将会略微快于需求，但供应状况仍然比较紧张。所以，原油价格－－现在包含着较高的风险贴水－－不大可能急剧下跌。基准假设是，不会发生大供应中断，到2010年前，油价将会逐渐回落到每桶40美元。这意味着，2006年每桶价格平均为56美元，2007年为52美元。 油价未来的上涨构成全球前景的一个潜在风险。由持续的负面供应震荡所造成的价格上涨尤其具有破坏性，因为产出将会直接受到石油和以石油为基础的投入品的供应减少的制约。这将与刚刚过去的几年恰恰相反，这一段时间，价格是在供应快速增长的背景下上涨的。如果石油发货量每天减少200万桶，由此导致的供应震荡将会推动价格在一年多时间内达到每桶90美元以上，将会导致次年全球增长下降1.5%。贸易条件对于低收入的石油进口国的冲击将会使这些国家的收入减少GDP的4%以上（高收入国家会更多），因为其经济相对来说是石油密集型的，因为供应震荡诱发的油价上涨不大可能伴随石油以外初级商品价格的上涨。 全球失衡仍将是一个问题 全球经常帐户失衡和美国经常帐户赤字（2005年可能达到7500亿美元）依然是重要的中期问题。2004年下半年和2005年初的紧张状况会有所缓解。相对于欧洲短期资产和长期资产的利差有所提高，这使私人部门更乐于购入美元标价的资产。结果，在2005年头七个月，按实际有效价格计算，美元升值了2.5%，外国中央银行的储备积累在支持经济帐户赤字方面的重要性有所下降。 这一缓解似乎是短命的。在某种程度上，私人流入增多只是投资者一次性在其资产组合调整从增加美国资产。从2005年第二季度开始，这种流入减少了，美元又面临下行压力。其结果，外国的储备积累再次成为支持美国经常帐户赤字的中间因素，从而又恢复了一种风险：外国中央银行行为的变化将会破坏稳定。中国和马来西亚最近作出的放宽自己的货币－－它们是钉住美元的－－对美元的波动幅度，将有助于缓解未来的压力，尤其是假如包括在该制度中的升值的幅度在实践中被实施的时候。从全球范围来看，在赤字国家，政策应当继续集中于增加公共和私人储蓄，在盈余国家，则增加支出（尤其是对投资品） 低利率是不确定性之源 长期利率和利差－－在相当长时期内处于历史上较低水平－－的未来走向是一个重要的不确定因素。若干因素帮助维持了低水平的利率，包括整个发达国家连续几年非常宽松的货币政策，欧洲由老龄化导致的储蓄增加，美国和亚洲的现金平衡表改善；及较低的通货膨胀环境－－这部分是由中国和前苏联集团国家进入全球市场带来的竞争所致。这些因素的大多数是临时性的，可能逐渐消退，从而导致长期基准利率缓慢上升。事实上，10年期美国国债的收益自9月以来已上升50个基点。 但这些临时性因素可能继续发挥作用，逆转或中止最近的长期利率上升趋势（就像过去一样）。这将会鼓励比预测的更强劲的需求，但也会恶化产能约束。其结果是，油价将会被推高，这将会激起一个更为剧烈的通货膨胀周期，最终将是一次衰退。 另一种可能是，这些力量更快地消散，导致长期利率更快地上升达到长期均衡水平，这将会引起一次更显著的减速，长期收益和通货膨胀最近的上升就提示，高利率却是一种现实的可能。 最后一点，增长减速和全球失衡的环境会增加贸易保护主义加剧的风险。在这一点上，决策者需要采取协调的努力以确保多哈回合能够取得成功，这样，主要出口农产品的发展中国家就能够从贸易自由化受益，就像其他国家从制造业和原材料部门的自由贸易中受益一样。 原文：Slower but still strong growth World GDP is estimated to have increased by3.2 percent in 2005, down from 3.8 in 2004.Growth is projected to be stable in 2006, be-fore strengthening somewhat in 2007. The slowdown that began in the second half of 2004 was experienced throughout the industrialized world, with growth in Europe still under performing its potential. In contrast, the economies of the United States and Japan, de-spite having slowed, are expanding at close to their maximum sustainable rates. Among large developing economies, GDP in 2005 continued to expand rapidly in China and India (in excess of 9 percent and about7 percent, respectively), but slowed in Russia as growth in oil production weakened. High oil prices, in combination with domestic capacity constraints and slower import demand from high-income countries, are estimated to have reduced growth among oil-importing developing countries from 6.9 percent to 6.1percent. In terms of real incomes, the slow-down was much sharper－from 6.4 percent to3.7 percent. Despite still growing oil revenues ,reduced opportunities to expand production in the petroleum sector meant that output growth in oil-exporting developing countries also eased, from 6.6 percent to 5.6 percent. During 2006 the expansion among high-income countries is projected to be stable, at about 2.5 percent, before picking up a bit in2007. This reflects a combination of improved performance in Europe and stable growth in the United States and Japan. In the United States, higher oil prices and tighter monetary policy are expected to offset the positive stimulus to growth from past depreciation. The projected pickup in Europe occurs despite a significant drag on growth from high oil prices whose effects are expected to be more than offset by low interest rates, pent up investment demand, and a dissipation of most of the negative consequences following the euro’s real-effective appreciation. In Japan, strengthening domestic demand and supportive macroeconomic policies should enable growth to re-main close to potential, despite high oil prices. Growth in developing economies is projected to slow modestly from an estimated5.9 percent in 2005 to 5.5 percent by 2007.In East and South Asia, the expansion is projected to moderate somewhat but remain very strong, particularly in China and India .In the Middle East and in both North and Sub-Saharan Africa, strong oil revenues should buoy internal demand among oil ex-porters and partially offset capacity constraints that will slow production growth. The projected easing of growth in Latin America and the Caribbean reflects weaker non oilcommodity prices as well as a return to trend growth in several countries that reboundedvery strongly in 2004. In Europe and Central Asia, the waning of the growth bonus following EU accession and capacity constraints in oil-producing countries are expected to con-tribute to a modest slowing of the expansion. Tight commodity markets Weaker global growth should reduce the strain in non-oil commodity markets. Already there are signs of stabilization, and even of decline, in the prices of agricultural products ,where supply has responded to high prices. Metals and shipping prices also show signs of easing, although to a lesser extent. In oil markets, the projected slowdown is not expected to be sufficient to generate a substantial easing of prices. While crude oil supply is growing marginally faster than demand, supply conditions are expected to remain tight. As a result, crude oil prices, which currently embody a large risk premium, are not expected to fall rapidly. The baseline assumes that no major supply disruptions occur and that there will be a gradual decline in oil prices toward$40 per barrel by 2010. This implies an aver-age price of $56 for a barrel of oil in 2006 and$52 in 2007. Future spikes in oil prices form a potential risk to global prospects. A price hike generated by a sustained negative supply shock would be particularly disruptive, because out-put would be constrained directly by the reduced availability of oil and petroleum-based inputs. This would be in contrast to the recent past, when prices rose in the context of rapidly growing supply. A supply shock that reduced oil deliveries by 2 million barrels per day could push prices to more than $90 a barrel for more than a year, resulting in a 1.5 percent reduction in global growth by the second year following the shock.. The terms-of-trade impact for low-income oil-importing economies would reduce incomes in these countries by more than 4 percent of their GDP (much more than for high-income countries) because their economies are relatively oil intensive, and because a supply shock–induced increase in oil prices is unlikely to be accompanied by higher non-oil commodity prices. Global imbalances remain an issue Global current account imbalances and the U.S. current account deficit (which is expected to exceed $750 billion in 2005) remain important medium-term problems. During late 2004 and early 2005 tensions eased somewhat. Rising interest rate differentials relative to European short- and long-term assets made private sector purchases of dollar–denominated assets more attractive. As a result, the dollar appreciated some 2.5 percent in real-effective terms during the first seven months of 2005, and reserve accumulation by foreign central banks became less important in the financing of the current account deficit. This respite appears to have been short-lived. To some extent, the increased private flows represented a one-off portfolio adjustment toward U.S. assets by investors. Beginning in the second quarter of 2005, the flows diminished, and the dollar faced renewed downward pressure. As a result, foreign reserve accumulation once again became a critical component in the financing of the U.S. current account deficit, restoring the risk that a change in behavior on the part of foreign central bankers could prove destabilizing. Recent decisions by China and Malaysia to widen the range of currencies to which their own currencies are pegged could help ease future pressures, especially if the scope for appreciation included in the regime is exercised in practice. Globally, policy should continue to focus on increasing public and private savings in deficit countries and increasing spending (notably on investment goods) in surplus countries. Low interest rates are a source of uncertainty The future path of long-term interest rates and spreads, which have been at historically low levels for an extended period, is an important uncertainty. A number of factors have helped maintain interest rates at low levels, including several years of very loose monetary policy throughout the developed world; increased aging related savings in Europe; balance sheet consolidation in the United States and Asia; and a low inflationary environment－thanks, in part, to increased competition following the entry into global markets of China and members of the former Soviet bloc. Most of these factors are temporary and are expected to gradually abate, resulting in a steady rise in long term rates in the baseline. Indeed, yields on 10-year U.S. Treasuries have risen 50 basis points since September. However, these temporary factors could continue to hold sway, reversing or bringing to a halt the recent increase in long-term rates(as they have in the past). This would prompt stronger-than-projected demand, but also ex-acerbate capacity constraints. As a result, oil prices could get pushed higher, which would provoke a more brutal inflationary cycle, and ultimately, a recession. Alternatively, these forces could dissipate more rapidly, causing long-term interest rates to rise more quickly toward long-term equilibrium levels, which would provoke a more pronounced slowdown. While not the most likely scenario, the recent rise in long term yields and inflation suggest that a higher interest-rate scenario is a real possibility. Finally, this environment of slowing growth and global imbalances raises the risk of rising protectionism. In this regard, policy-makers need to make a concerted effort to en-sure that the Doha round reaches a successful conclusion so that developing countries specializing in the export of agricultural products can benefit from trade liberalization in the same way that other countries have profited from freer trade in the manufacturing and raw materials sectors. |
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