1 论文标题：

Why Does the World Need a Reserve Asset with a Hard Anchor?

2 作者信息：

Dongsheng Di: School of International Studies, Renmin University of China & a Research fellow with International Monetary Institute of Renmin University of China

Warren Coats: Former chief of the SDR Division of the Finance Department, IMF

Yuxuan Zhao: Agriculture Global Practice, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

3 出处:

Cite this article:

Dongsheng Di, Warren Coats, Yuxuan Zhao. Why Does the World Need a Reserve Asset with a Hard Anchor? [J]. Front. Econ. China, 2017, 12(4): 545-570.

链接:
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/10.3868/s060-006-017-0023-7
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/Y2017/V12/I4/545

4 摘要

为什么世界需要硬锚储备资产？

翟东升

中国人民大学国际关系学院副教授

Warren Coats

前国际货币基金组织金融部特别提款权部主管

赵宇轩

世界银行农业全球发展实践局

摘要：自1970年代以来，全球货币体系呈现两大特点：一是以少数主权货币作为全球储备货币，二是主要货币间汇率变动不居。本文指出，使用美元作为国际储备货币，无论对于美国还是对于世界其他国家，其代价都超过收益。代价之一便是，美国需要为世界其他国家供应货币，其制造业出口因此而成为其经常账户赤字的牺牲品。另一方面，汇率波动的不可预测性对国际贸易带来损害，平白增加了贸易的汇率风险及其对冲成本。此外，美国关闭了黄金窗口，从而终止了自身将美元兑换为黄金的国际义务，这种做法移除了美国和许多其他国家在财政赤字问题上的重要限制，因此助长了过度杠杆借贷，这是2008年金融危机的重要诱因。本文建议真实的特别提款权应该是按照货币局制度来发行的国际储备货币，而不是目前以几种主权货币构成的货币篮子来作为价值基准。以此路径改造后的真正的特别提款权作为全球储备货币，将使全球货币体系获得其应有的硬锚。

作者简介：

翟东升: 中国人民大学国际关系学院副院长、副教授，中国人民大学国际货币所特约研究员，博士。研究领域涉及中国对外经济关系、金融与货币的国际政治经济学等领域。

Warren Coats: 国际货币基金组织金融部特别提款权部前主管。主要在央行货币政策领域提供咨询建议，并专注于如何提升央行制定和执行货币政策的能力。曾辅导全球20多国中央银行（尤其是前苏东转轨国家）建立和改善其市场化金融体系和货币政策体系。

赵宇轩: 世界银行农业全球发展实践局专员，中国人民大学对外战略研究中心兼职研究员，主要研究美国经济、非洲经济等问题。

Abstract: From the 1970s, the global currency system has two features: the use of one or a few sovereign currencies as the global reserve asset and the floating exchange rate regime between major currencies. This paper points out that the costs of the dollar’s use as an international reserve currency exceed the benefits for both the US and the rest of the world. These costs include the exporting of American manufacturing as a byproduct of its current account deficit needed to supply its currency to the rest of the world. In addition to the detriment to trade from unpredictable exchange rate fluctuations, the termination of the U.S. obligation to redeem its currency for gold also removed an important restraint on deficit financing for the US and many other countries in the short-run, thus promoting excessive leverage that was a major contributor to the 2008 financial crisis. The paper suggests replacing several main countries’ currencies in international reserves with a real Special Drawing Right (SDR) issued according to currency board rules.