英文文献：Invasive Species Management: Importers, Border Enforcement, and Risk-入侵物种管理:进口商、边境执法和风险
英文文献作者：Ameden, Holly A.,Cash, Sean B.,Zilberman, David
英文文献摘要：
Invasive species are a negative externality associated with imported goods. Policies aimed at excluding pests associated with imports include pre-shipment treatment requirements, varied inspection schemes, treatment at the border, penalties, and import bans or restrictions. Existing policies are based on the reasoning that increased enforcement effort will result in higher detection levels, or more specifically, that increased inspection will result in a higher number of interceptions and in turn, higher compliance. In addition to a deterrence effect, however, under which importers respond to increased enforcement with increased due care with respect to pest control, importers may respond in ways that regulators do not intend. For example, importers may choose to not bring goods into the country, may ship a reduced amount, or may switch ports-of-entry. Moreover, different types of firms are likely to respond to enforcement in different ways. In this paper, we present a framework to analyze invasive species border enforcement given heterogeneous importers and ports. We develop a theoretical model of firm response to border enforcement, analyze both the intended and unintended effects of this enforcement for different types of firms, and evaluate the tradeoffs associated with location. Firms not only consider the changes in the levels of enforcement and other conditions at a single port, they consider the cost and benefit tradeoffs associated with location e.g., differences in inspection intensity or port-entry fees versus distance to port-of-entry and final market across ports and may switch ports. The result is that increased inspection intensity may not result the overall damages from invasive species introductions.

入侵物种是与进口商品相关的负外部性。旨在排除与进口有关的害虫的政策包括装运前处理要求、各种检查方案、边境处理、处罚以及进口禁令或限制。现有的策略是基于这样的推理:增加的执行力度将导致更高的检测级别，或者更具体地说，增加的检查将导致更高的拦截次数，进而导致更高的遵从性。然而，除了威慑作用外，进口商应对加强的执法力度，对害虫控制更加注意，进口商可能以监管机构不打算的方式应对。例如，进口商可能选择不把货物带进本国，可能减少装运数量，或者可能改变入境口岸。此外，不同类型的公司可能会以不同的方式对执行作出反应。在本文中，我们提出了一个框架来分析入侵物种边界执行给定的异类输入者和端口。我们建立了一个企业对边境执法反应的理论模型，分析了边境执法对不同类型企业的预期和非预期影响，并评估了与地点相关的权衡。公司不仅考虑单一港口的执法水平和其他条件的变化，他们还考虑与地点有关的成本和利益权衡，例如检查强度或港口进入费用与港口和最终市场的距离之间的差异，并可能交换港口。其结果是，增加的检查强度可能不会导致入侵物种引入的整体损害。