英文文献：Contracting for Consistency: Hog Quality and the Use of Marketing Contracts-为了一致性而签订合同:猪品质和销售合同的使用
英文文献作者：Jang, Jongick,Sykuta, Michael E.
英文文献摘要：
Achieving consistency in hog quality has been one of the greatest challenges in the US pork industry. Packers, processors and retailers all ranked lack of uniformity in live hogs, carcasses, and retail cuts with regard to size and backfat as the most important quality issue facing the industry in the mid 1990s (NPPC, Pork Quality Audit, 1994), and quality consistency continues to be a leading industry concern (Martinez and Zering, 2004). The past 15 years have also witnessed dramatic changes in the organization of the US hog industry. In 1993, over 82% of hogs were sold through spot markets while 11% were sold under marketing contracts. By 2005, only 11% of hogs were sold through spot markets, with 67% sold under marketing contracts and over 20% owned by packers through formal integration or production contracts. This change in industry structure has not gone unnoticed by agricultural economists. A large body of literature examines the relations between hog quality and newly developed organization modes, particularly production contracting and vertical integration. A variety of theoretical frameworks and empirical approaches have been employed, whether using surveys (Kliebenstein and Lawrence, 1995), simulation techniques (Poray, 2002), contract document analysis (Martinez and Zering, 2004), and quality outcome analysis (Muth, et al., 2007). However, research focusing on production contracts and formal vertical integration fails to address the dominant institutional form, namely marketing contracts. Likewise, research focusing on market-based incentive mechanisms fails to provide a consistent explanation for the use and design of long-term hog marketing contracts. We propose a theoretical explanation for the use of long-term marketing contracts in the presence of buyer-specific quality attributes in an otherwise commoditized industry. This theoretical framework draws from and builds upon existing theories of contracting and organizational economics. In particular, the paper develops an analytical model that accounts for the use and structure of long-term marketing contracts to increase intertemporal quality consistency in hog procurement. The paper links the packer’s decision to move from spot-market transactions to long-term marketing contracts to the packer’s downstream product differentiation strategy. We provide empirical evidence to support the model and its explanatory power relative to existing theories.

实现猪肉质量的一致性一直是美国猪肉行业面临的最大挑战之一。包装工队,加工商和零售商都排名在生猪缺乏一致性,尸体,和零售削减对大小和背膘行业面临的最重要的质量问题在1990年代中期(国家猪肉厂商、猪肉质量审计,1994),和质量一致性仍然是主导产业关注(马丁内斯和Zering, 2004)。在过去的15年里，美国养猪业的组织结构也发生了巨大变化。1993年，82%以上的生猪通过现货市场销售，11%通过销售合同销售。到2005年，只有11%的生猪通过现货市场销售，67%的生猪是根据销售合同销售的，超过20%的生猪由包装商通过正式的整合或生产合同销售。农业经济学家并没有忽视这种产业结构的变化。大量的文献研究了生猪品质与新发展的组织模式之间的关系，特别是生产承包和垂直整合。采用了各种理论框架和实证方法，包括调查(Kliebenstein和Lawrence, 1995)、模拟技术(Poray, 2002)、合同文件分析(Martinez和Zering, 2004)和质量结果分析(Muth等，2007)。然而，专注于生产合同和正式的垂直整合的研究未能解决占主导地位的制度形式，即营销合同。同样，侧重于市场激励机制的研究也未能对长期生猪销售合同的使用和设计提供一致的解释。我们提出了一个理论解释，长期营销合同的使用，在存在买方特有的质量属性，在其他商品化的行业。这一理论框架借鉴并建立在现有的承包经济学和组织经济学的理论基础上。特别地，本文开发了一个分析模型，解释了长期销售合同的使用和结构，以增加生猪采购的跨期质量一致性。该论文将封隔器从现货市场交易转向长期营销合同的决策与封隔器下游产品差异化战略联系起来。我们提供了经验证据来支持该模型及其解释力相对于现有理论。