6.Ali Ghaffarinejad,Mohammad Kazem Akbari. An incentive compatible and distributed reputation mechanism based on context similarity for service oriented systems[J]. Future Generation Computer Systems,2013,29(3).
ABSTRACT:Abstract(#br)One major challenge in service oriented systems is how to establish a trusted relationship between different parties. A reputation mechanism is the best-known method to build trust and foster mutual cooperation. Reputation mechanisms require correct and honest feedback to function effectively. An incentive compatible reputation mechanism entices self-interested parties to report the truth by explicit rewards which can offset the potential profits that could be gained by lying. The existing incentive compatible mechanisms are centralized which gather feedback merely through a specific service offered by a service provider, while they ignore some useful information on other services that are offered by the same service provider. In this paper, we introduce a novel distributed reputation mechanism based on a number of special reputation centers (SRCs) for service oriented environments. Each SRC gathers reputation information for a predetermined service offered by different service providers. The proposed model is collusion resistant and offers incentives to SRCs for making an attempt at gathering reputation information thoroughly and report it honestly. We then also evaluate the integrity and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism by carrying out experiments under different settings of the electronic marketplace. Examination of the results confirms that the new approach outperforms other incentive compatible reputation solutions reported in the literature. 还原
KEYWORDS:Trust management; Distributed reputation mechanism; Incentive compatible; Service oriented architecture; Context similarity;
JOURNAL:Future Generation Computer Systems
SOURCE:Elsevierjournal
DOI:10.1016/j.future.2012.03.021
YEAR:2013
PAGES:863-875
PUBLISHER:Elsevier B.V.
7.Incentive compatible market design with applications
作者： M. Bumin Yenmez
作者单位： 1Carnegie Mellon University
刊名： International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, Vol.44 (3), pp.543-569
来源数据库： Springer Journal
DOI： 10.1007/s00182-014-0444-8
关键词： Auctions; Matching; Incomplete information; Incentive compatibility; Multidimensional types;
英文摘要： Abstract(#br)This paper studies markets for heterogeneous goods using mechanism-design theory. For each combination of desirable properties, we derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or we show that it does not exist. Each participant’s utility is quasi-linear in money, and depends upon the allocation that he gets and his privately known multidimensional ‘type.’ The key properties are incentive compatibility, individual rationality, efficiency, and budget balance. The main results characterize mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible in combination with other properties.
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