摩根斯坦利亚洲主席史蒂芬.罗奇预测2010年经济可能二次探底
2010-01-11 15:25

Double-Dip Risk Seen in Stall Speed Recovery 2010年经济可能二次探底 January 5, 2010 Stephen S. Roach Chairman, Morgan Stanley Asia 2010年1月5日，摩根斯坦利亚洲主席史蒂芬.罗奇（ERIC用汉语概括内容） Where there was despair a year ago, today there is hope. Policy makers have been successful in putting in a bottom to the most wrenching crisis and recession of the post-World War II era. Yet the outlook remains uncertain. That’s because the bottoming process, however encouraging, does little to inform us about the character of the coming economic recovery. 经济从底部回升，但未来经济复苏形态不明确。 There are four key reasons to remain skeptical about the vigor and sustainability of any rebound in the global economy: First, the financial crisis, itself, is far from over. The latest IMF estimates put the potential for worldwide write-downs of toxic assets at approximately US$3.4 trillion; so far, realized markdowns have been only about half that amount. That points to further earnings impairments for financial institutions and concomitant restraints on their lending capacity. 四个原因。第一：金融危机还远未结束，IMF预测全球不良资产3.4万亿美元，目前金融机构已核减数额约1.7万亿美元。 Second, the breadth of this global recession was staggering. At the low point of this cycle in March 2009, fully 75% of the world’s economies were contracting. Typically, that figure is closer to 50%. This means it will be much harder to turn around this recession-torn world. 第二，全球经济衰退的广度很大，以往衰退波及约50%的经济体，2009年3月的谷底时，波及范围达到75%。 Third, the demand side of the global economy is likely to be restrained by a protracted pullback of the over-extended American consumer. In the face of a massive labor market shock to jobs and wage earnings, together with the bursting of property and credit bubbles, the consumption share of the US economy is likely fall by five full percentage points of GDP— from its current record of 71.2% to the pre-bubble norm of 66%. This should reduce trend growth of real consumption from the nearly 4% pace of the pre-crisis decade to 1.5% to 2% over the next 3 to 5 years. No other consumer in the world is capable of filling this void. 第三：全球经济需求不振，美国消费占GDP的比重将从最高记录71.2%降至危机前的平均水平66%，这一消费缺口其他国家无法取代。 Fourth, the supply side of the global economy suffers from massive imbalances—especially China-centric developing Asia. While, on the surface, post-crisis resilience of the Chinese economy has been impressive, it turns out that fully 95% of the 7.7% GDP growth realized in the first three quarters of 2009 was concentrated in the fixed investment sector, which already accounts for an unheard of 45% of GDP. By compounding its existing imbalances, to say nothing of funding this stimulus by a record surge of state-directed bank lending, China risks a serious misallocation of capital and a worrisome deterioration of bank loan quality. 第四：全球经济供给严重失衡。表面上看中国复苏很快，但09年前三个季度7.7%的GDP增长95%来自固定资产投资拉动，引发人们对银行贷款质量的担心。 Stiff post-crisis headwinds should hold trend growth in world GDP to about 2.5% over the next three years—the weakest recovery on record and close to the global “stall speed”. 后危机时代的前三年，全球GDP增长预计约2.5%，为有史以来最疲软的经济复苏，可能导致全球经济的“失速下坠”。 Reflecting these powerful headwinds, I expect trend growth in world GDP to average about 2.5% over the next three years—the weakest recovery of the modern era. Significantly, such an outcome would be very close to the “stall speed” for a US$70 trillion global economy—meaning that a shock could easily trigger a relapse, or the dreaded double dip. 全球70万亿的经济规模经受不起再一次的冲击，可能导致二次探底。 While seemingly sacrilegious in these days of froth, the theory of the double dip is hardly controversial. Normally, in a cyclical upturn, the release of pent-up demands provides an ample cushion of cyclical resilience—enabling an economy to withstand periodic shocks. By contrast, a recovery that lacks that cushion is far less capable of warding off the unexpected blow. Right now, of course, these concerns ring hollow. Fueled by a temporary boost from the inventory cycle, the hopes and dreams of a vigorous, or V-shaped, recovery suddenly seem credible. But as the inventory dynamic fades—and it always does—and the weak state of underlying demand re-emerges, a post-crisis recovery could quickly become vulnerable. 抑制的消费需求的释放是经济稳步复苏的基础，而现在的复苏并非需求驱动，因此较为脆弱。 （Note: This essay was originally published on the Bloomberg service as a commentary piece on January 5, 2010 under the title: “Double-Dip Risk Seen in ‘Stall Speed’ Recovery”. ） Two potential shocks would play right into that vulnerability—the first being a failed exit strategy from the Great Stimulus. Policy makers are not lacking in tools or tactics to withdraw the extraordinary fiscal and monetary stimulus that has been put in place to save the world. Unfortunately, they are lacking in political will. The odds are high that America’s Federal Reserve will once again embrace an “asymmetrical” exit strategy—quick to slash the federal funds after the onset of a crisis but slow to normalize policy settings in recovery. This would be a replay of the delayed normalization of 2002-06, that played a key role in fueling new bubbles and imbalances, which then set the stage for the Great Crisis. 脆弱性体现在两个方面：一是ZF救助的撤出迟缓，可能重现2002-06年的历史，导致新泡沫和下一轮经济危机的出现。 Such a weak recovery lacks the normal cyclical cushion that could insulate the world from the impacts of a shock and prevent a recessionary relapse, or a double dip. A second possible shock would be heightened trade frictions and protectionism—especially a Washington-led outbreak of China bashing. With the US unemployment rate likely to remain above 9.5% heading into the mid-term congressional election of 2010, the Chinese currency issue has once again become a bi-partisan lightning rod. If Washington imposes trade sanctions, the Chinese would undoubtedly reduce their appetite for dollar-denominated assets, with severe implications for the dollar and/or real long-term interest rates in the US. 二是日趋激烈的中美贸易摩擦。美国失业率高居不下，就会拿中国开刀，指责中国操纵汇率偷取美国人的工作机会。一旦美国采取贸易制裁，中国无疑会减少美元类资产，严重影响美元稳定以及美国的长期实际利率。 Two possible shocks—a failed exit strategy from the extraordinary fiscal and monetary stimulus or an outbreak of Washington-led China bashing— put the probability of a global double dip at 40% in 2010. 因此，预测2010年全球经济二次探底的可能性为40%。 No one can predict shocks. But the theory of the double dip is very clear in one important respect: Shocks can deal lethal blows to anemic recoveries. That remains a real risk in this still fragile post-crisis climate. In contrast to the denial prevalent in today’s ebullient financial market climate, I would assign about a 40% chance to a global double dip at some point in 2010. （Stephen S. Roach is Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and author of The Next Asia (Wiley 2009). Mr. Roach serves as the Firm’s senior representative to clients, governments, and regulators across the region. Prior to this appointment as Asia Chairman, Mr. Roach was Morgan Stanley’s Chief Economist.）