Hardcover: 551 pages Publisher: The MIT Press; 1st edition (August 14, 2000) Language:English
Product Description What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems. About the Author Torsten Persson is Director of the Institute for International Economic Studies at Stockholm University and Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics. Guido Tabellini is Director of the Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research and Professor of Economics at Bocconi University. Contents Series Foreword xiii
Foreword xv
Preface xvii
1 General Introduction 1
1.1 Economic Policy 6
1.2 Politics 10
1.3 Concluding Remarks 14
I TOOLS OF POLITICAL ECONOMICS 15
2 Preferences and Institutions 19
2.1 A General Policy Problem 19
2.2 Restricting Preferences 21
2.3 Restricting Institutions 28
2.4 Discussion 40
2.5 Notes on the Literature 41
2.6 Problems 41
3 Electoral Competition 47
3.1 A Simple Model of Public Finance 48
3.2 Downsian Electoral Competition 49
3.3 Median-Voter Equilibria 51
3.4 Probabilistic Voting 52
3.5 Lobbying 58
3.6 Discussion 62
3.7 Notes on the Literature 63
3.8 Problems 64
4 Agency 69
4.1 Efficient Electoral Competition 70
4.2 Inefficient Electoral Competition 71
4.3 Enforceability, Verifiability, and Observability 73
4.4 Electoral Accountability 77
4.5 Career Concerns 81
4.6 Discussion 87
4.7 Notes on the Literature 89
4.8 Problems 91
viii Contents
5 Partisan Politicians 97
5.1 Policy Convergence 97
5.2 Policy Divergence 99
5.3 Endogenous Candidates 101
5.4 Legislative Bargaining 104
5.5 Discussion 108
5.6 Notes on the Literature 109
5.7 Problems 110
II REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS 115
6 General-Interest Politics 117
6.1 General Transfers 118
6.2 Pensions 123
6.3 Regional Transfers 132
6.4 Unemployment Insurance 140
6.5 Discussion 149
6.6 Notes on the Literature 151
6.7 Problems 154
7 Special-Interest Politics 159
7.1 A Model of Local Public Goods 161
7.2 Legislative Bargaining 164
7.3 Lobbying 171
7.4 Electoral Competition 175
7.5 Interactions 180
7.6 Discussion 191
7.7 Notes on the Literature 192
7.8 Problems 195
III COMPARATIVE POLITICS 201
8 Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition 205
8.1 The Economic Model 206
8.2 The Politics of Electoral Competition 207
8.3 Single-District (Proportional) Elections 210
8.4 Multiple-District (Majoritarian) Elections 212
Contents ix
8.5 Broad versus Targeted Redistribution 215
8.6 Discussion 218
8.7 Notes on the Literature 220
8.8 Problems 221
9 Institutions and Accountability 225
9.1 Electoral Rules and Career Concerns 226
9.2 Electoral Rules and Accountability 234
9.3 Separation of Powers 239
9.4 Notes on the Literature 245
9.5 Problems 246
10 Political Regimes 251
10.1 Policy Choices in a Simple Legislature 253
10.2 Presidential-Congressional Regimes 259
10.3 Parliamentary Regimes 262
10.4 Discussion 266
10.5 Notes on the Literature 268
10.6 Problems 269
IV DYNAMIC POLITICS 275
11 Dynamic Policy Problems 277
11.1 Analyzing Dynamic Policy Games 278
11.2 Examples 286
11.3 Discussion 298
11.4 Notes on the Literature 299
11.5 Problems 300
12 Capital Taxation 305
12.1 A Simple Model of Dynamic Taxation 306
12.2 Credibility 307
12.3 Politics 317
12.4 Tax Competition 325
12.5 Discussion 336
12.6 Notes on the Literature 338
12.7 Problems 339
x Contents
13 Public Debt 345
13.1 A Simple Model of Public Debt 346
13.2 The Dynamic Common-Pool Problem 348
13.3 Political Instability 351
13.4 Delayed Stabilizations 361
13.5 Debt and Intergenerational Politics 364
13.6 Discussion 366
13.7 Notes on the Literature 367
13.8 Problems 369
14 Growth 373
14.1 Income Inequality and Growth 374
14.2 Political Instability and Growth 377
14.3 Special Interests, Rents, and Growth 379
14.4 Other Political Determinants of Growth 384
14.5 Discussion 385
14.6 Notes on the Literature 386
14.7 Problems 387
V MONETARY POLITICS 393
15 Credibility of Monetary Policy 397
15.1 A Simple Model of Monetary Policy 397
15.2 Ex Ante Optimality 399
15.3 Credibility 401
15.4 Reputation 405
15.5 Dynamics 408
15.6 Notes on the Literature 412
15.7 Problems 414
16 Electoral Cycles 419
16.1 Career Concerns and Political Business Cycles 420
16.2 Partisan Cycles 426
16.3 Notes on the Literature 430
16.4 Problems 431
17 Institutions and Incentives 435
17.1 Simple Rules and Escape Clauses 436
17.2 Central Bank Independence 441
Contents xi
17.3 Inflation Targets and Contracts 445
17.4 Notes on the Literature 452
17.5 Problems 453
18 International Policy Coordination 459
18.1 A Simple Two-Country Model 460
18.2 Incentives 462
18.3 Institutions 467
18.4 Discussion 473
18.5 Notes on the Literature 474
18.6 Problems 475
19 What Next? 479
19.1 Some Positive Questions 479
19.2 Analytical Issues 483
19.3 Concluding Remarks 488
References 489
Author Index 515
Subject Index 521
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