本人贴一个大牛Patrick Bolton的公司金融理论教学大纲
Topics in Corporate Finance Theory
Professor Patrick Bolton
Overview
This course covers the major topics in corporate finance theory, with an emphasis on recent contributions and research questions. Students are expected to be familiar with basic notions in finance, contract theory and game theory. The course will begin with a brief overview of capital budgeting and early theories of leverage. The main focus of the lectures, however, will be on financial contracting under asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, control and corporate
governance, and financial intermediation. Grading will be based on a final exam or a term paper.
Required Readings
There is no suitable textbook for this course and the lectures will be based on research articles. The Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Volume 1A, Corporate Finance (eds.)
Some sections dealing with corporate finance of Contract Theory, Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), MIT Press are also useful background reading.
Course Outline
1. Capital Budgeting
Harris and Raviv (1996) “The Capital Budgeting Process, Incentives and Information” Journal of Finance 51, 1139-1174
2. Leverage: The Modigliani-Miller Theorem, Taxes and Financial Distress
Rajan and Zingales (1995) “What do we know about Capital Structure? Some evidence from International Data” Journal of Finance, 50, 1421-1460
Miller (1977) “Debt and Taxes” Journal of Finance 32, 261-276
3. Capital Structure: Incentives and Information
Jensen and Meckling (1976) “Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360
Myers (1977) “The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing” Journal of Financial Economics, 5: 147-175
Leland and Pyle (1977) “Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation” Journal of Finance, 32: 371-388
Myers and Majluf (1984) “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors do not have” Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221
4. Theories of debt
Gale, Douglas, and Martin Hellwig (1985), “Incentive Compatibility Debt Contracts: The One Period Problem”, Review of Economic Studies, 52:647-663.
Diamond, Douglas W. (1984), “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,” Review of Economic Studies, 51:393-414.
Innes (1990), “Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex-Ante Action Choices,” Journal of Economic Theory, 52:45-67.
5. Financial Contracting and Control Theories:
Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton (1992), “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial
Contracting,” Review of Economic Studies, 77:473-494.
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Jean Tirole (1994), “A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109:1027-1054.
Kaplan, Steven N., and Per Stromberg (2002), “Financial Contracting Theory meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore (1994), “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109:841-879.
Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore (1998), “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113:1-41.
以下文献略
6. The Structure of Financial Contracting.
7. Theories of Equity, Dividend Policy and Shareholder Control
8. The Liquidity-Control Tradeoff
9. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
10. Financial Intermediation and Liquidity Transformation
11. Financial Distress and Corporate Bankruptcy
[此贴子已经被作者于2006-3-1 8:35:54编辑过]
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