A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Hardcover)
by David M. Kreps (Author)
克瑞普斯这本微观教材应该是第一本以博弈论写的西方规范高级微观教材，
关键是：它的作者是大名鼎鼎的Kreps！
文件格式是Djvu
该书最精彩部分预告
part II: The price mechanism
chapter six: Pure exchange and general equilibrium  Prologue to part II 187
6.1. Pure exchange and price equilibrium 187
6.2. Why (not) believe in Waltasian equffibrinm? 193
6.3. The efficiency of a general equilibrium 199
6.4. Existence and the number of equilibria 205
6.5. Tmae, uncertainty, and general equffibrium 216
6.6. Bibliographic notes 223
6.7. Problems 225
chapter seven: The neoclassical firm
        
7.1. Models of the firm's technological capabilities 234
7.2. The profit function 239
7.3. Conditional factor demands and cost functions 250
7.4. From profit or cost functions to technology sets 253
7.5. Cost functions and -runs 255
7.6. Bibliographic notes 259
7.7. Problems 259
chapter eight: The competitive firm and perfect competition
        
8.1. A perfectly competitive market 264
8.2. Perfect competition and -runs 267
8.3. What's wrong with partial equilibrimn analysis?
8.4. General equffibrium with firms 283
8.5. Bibliographic notes 292
8.6. Problems 292
chapter nine: Monopoly
        
9.1. The standard theory 299
9.2. Maintaining monopoly 302
9.3. Multigood monopoly 304
9.4. Nonlinear pricing 306
9.5. Monopoly power? 314
9.6. Bibliographic notes 317
9.7. Problems 318
chapter ten: Imperfect competition
        
10.1. The classic models of duopoly 325
10.2. Bibliographic notes and discussion 340
10.3. Problems 347
part III: Noncooperative game theory
chapter eleven: Modeling competitive situations
        
Prologue to part III 355
11.1. Games in extensive form: An example 356
11.2. Games in extensive form: Formalities 363
11.3. Games in normal or stategic form 376
11.4. Mixed strategies and Kuhn's theorem
11.5. Bibliographic notes 384
11.6. Problems 385
chapter twelve: Solution concepts for noncooperative games 387
        
12.1. Opening remarks 387
12.2. Dominance and iterated dominance for normal form games 393
12.3. Backwards induction in games of complete and perfect information ' 399
12.4. Nash equilibrium 402
12.5. Equilibria in mixed strategies 407
12.6. Why might there be an obvious way to play a given game? 410
12.7. Refinements of Nash equilibrium 417
  12.7.1. Weak dominance 418 o
  12.7.2. Subgame perfection (and iterated weak dominance) 421
  12.7.3. Sequential equilibrium 425
  12.7.4. Restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs 432 ,
  12.7.5. Trembling-hand perfectio'.n 437
  12.7.6. Proper eqttih'bria and stable sets of eqttih'bria 442
12.8. Reprise: Classic duopoly .443
12.9. Bibliographic notes 449
12.10. Problems 451
chapter thirteen: Incomplete information and irrationality 463
        
13.1. Games of incomplete information 463
13.2. An application: Etry deterfence 468
13.3. Modeling irrationality 480
13.4. More on refinements: Complete theories
13.5. Bibliographic notes 496
13.6. Problems 498
chapter fourteen: Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation 503
        
14.1. The prisoners' dilemma 503
14.2. Repeating games can yield cooperation: The folk theorem 505
14.3. Noisy observables 515
14.4. Implicit collusion in oligopoly 524
14.5. Reputation 531
14.6. Reputation redux: Incomplete information 536
14.7. Bibliographic notes 543
14.8. Problems 546
chapter fifteen: Bilateral bargaining
        
15.1. Simultaneous offers and indetermifiancy 552
15.2. Focal equilibria 554
15.3. Rubinstein's model 556
15.4. The experimental evidence about alternating offers 565
15.5. Models with incomplete information 568
15.6. Bibliographic notes 570
15.7. Problems 571
part IV: Topics in information economics
chapter sixteen: Moral hazard and incentives 577
        
Prologue to part IV 577
16.1. Introduction 578
16.2. Effort incentives: A simple example 579
16.3. Fruitely many actions and outcomes 586
16.4. Continuous actions: The first-order approach 604
16.5. Bibliographic notes and variations 608
16.6. Problems 616
chapter seventeen: Adverse selection and market signaling 625
        
17.1. Akerlof's model of lemons 625
17.2. Signaling quality 629
17.3. Signaling and game theory 645
17.4. Bibliographic notes and discussion 650
17.5. Problems 654
chapter eighteen: The revelation principle and mechanism design
        
18.1. Optimal contracts designed for a single party
18.2. Optimal contracts for interacting parties 680
18.3. The pivot mechanism 704
18.4. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 712
18.5. Bibliographic notes 713