英文文献：Exploration in Teams and the Encouragement Effect: Theory and Evidence-团队探索与激励效应:理论与证据
英文文献作者：Emma von Essen,Marieke Huysentruyt,Topi Miettinen
英文文献摘要：
This paper analyzes a two-person, two-stage model of sequential exploration, where both information and payoff externalities exist, and tests the derived hypotheses in the laboratory. We theoretically show that even when agents are self-interested and perfectly rational, the information externality induces an encouragement effect: a positive effect of first-player exploration on the optimality of the second-player exploring as well. When agents have other-regarding preferences and imperfectly optimize, the encouragement effect is strongest. The explorative nature of the game raises the expected surplus compared to a payoff equivalent public goods game. We empirically confirm our main theoretical predictions using a novel experimental paradigm. Our findings are relevant for motivating and managing groups and teams innovating not only for private but also, and especially so, for public goods.

摘要本文分析了一个信息外部性和收益外部性同时存在的二人两阶段序列探索模型，并在实验室中对导出的假设进行了检验。我们从理论上证明，即使行为人是自我利益和完全理性的，信息外部性也会引发鼓励效应:第一参与者探索对第二参与者探索的最优性也会产生积极的影响。当行为人有关于他人的偏好且不完全优化时，激励效应最强。与收益相当的公共产品博弈相比，该博弈的探索性性质提高了预期盈余。我们用一种新的实验范式来实证地证实我们的主要理论预测。我们的发现与激励和管理团队的创新有关，不仅针对私人，而且尤其针对公共产品。