续5:

(f) Barclays...................................................................................................703
(6) Government Communications..................................................................711
(a) Treasury Dinner ....................................................................................712
(b) Short Sales ..............................................................................................713
(c) Possibility of Federal Assistance.........................................................716
(7) Lehman’s Bankruptcy ................................................................................718
VOLUME 3
Section III.A.4: Repo 105
4. Repo 105 ...................................................................................................................732
a) Repo 105 – Executive Summary......................................................................732
b) Introduction .......................................................................................................750
c) Why the Examiner Investigated Lehman’s Use of Repo 105
Transactions .......................................................................................................764
d) A Typical Repo 105 Transaction .....................................................................765
(1) The Genesis of Lehman’s Repo 105 Program in 2001 ............................765
(2) Repo 105 Transactions Versus Ordinary Repo Transactions ...............766
(a) Lehman’s Accounting Treatment of Repo 105 Transactions
Versus Ordinary Repo Transactions ..................................................768
(b) Lehman’s Accounting Policy for Repo 105 Transactions................775
(c) The Accounting Purpose of the Larger Haircut ...............................777
(d) Lehman Did Not Record a Cash Borrowing but Recorded a
Derivative Asset in a Repo 105 Transaction......................................781
(3) Anatomy of Repo 105 Transactions and the Linklaters True Sale
Opinion Letter .............................................................................................782
(4) Types of Securities Used in Repo 105 Transactions...............................793
(5) Product Controllers Manually Booked Repo 105 Transactions ...........797
e) Managing Balance Sheet and Leverage .........................................................800
(1) Lehman Management’s Focus in Late 2007 on Reducing the
Firm’s Reported Leverage..........................................................................802
(a) Lehman’s Calculation of Net Leverage .............................................804
(2) By January 2008, Lehman Decided to Cut its Net Leverage in
Half to Win Back the Confidence of the Market, Lenders and
Investors .......................................................................................................805
(a) Bart McDade, as Newly Appointed Balance Sheet Czar,
Advised the Executive Committee in March 2008 to Cap
Lehman’s Use of Repo 105 Transactions ...........................................809
(b) McDade Became President and COO on June 12, 2008 and
Authorized the Reduction of Repo 105 Usage..................................819
(3) The Market’s Increased Scrutiny of the Leverage of Investment
Banks.............................................................................................................822
(a) The Cost of Deleveraging ....................................................................825
(4) “Sticky” Inventory and FID’s Balance Sheet Breaches Hampered
Lehman’s Ability to Manage Its Net Leverage.......................................828
(5) Deleveraging Resulted in Intense Pressure at Quarter‐End to
Meet Balance Sheet Targets for Reporting Purposes .............................843
(6) Lehman’s Earnings Calls and Press Release Statements
Regarding Leverage....................................................................................845
(a) Analysts’ Statements Regarding Lehman’s Leverage .....................850
f) The Purpose of Lehman’s Repo 105 Program Was to Reverse
Engineer Publicly Reported Financial Results..............................................853
(1) Lehman Did Not Disclose Its Accounting Treatment For or Use
of Repo 105 Transactions in Its Forms 10‐K and 10‐Q...........................853
(a) Lehman’s Outside Disclosure Counsel Was Unaware of
Lehman’s Repo 105 Program ..............................................................855
(2) Lehman’s Repo 105 Practice Improved the Firm’s Public Balance
Sheet Profile at Quarter‐End .....................................................................856
(a) Contemporaneous Documents Confirm That Lehman
Undertook Repo 105 Transactions to Reduce Its Balance
Sheet and Reverse Engineer Its Leverage..........................................859
(b) Witness Statements to the Examiner Regarding the True
Purpose of Lehman’s Repo 105 Practice............................................867
(3) Quarter‐End Spikes in Lehman’s Repo 105 Usage Also Suggest
the True Purpose of Lehman’s Repo 105 Practice Was Balance
Sheet Manipulation.....................................................................................870
(4) Repo 105 Transactions Served No Business Purpose Other Than
Balance Sheet Reduction ............................................................................877
(a) Repo 105 Transactions Came at a Higher Cost than Ordinary
Repo Transactions.................................................................................877
(b) Witnesses Also Stated That Financing Was Not the Real
Motive for Undertaking Repo 105 Transactions...............................882
g) The Materiality of Lehman’s Repo 105 Practice ...........................................884
(1) The Repo 105 Program Exposed Lehman to Potential
“Reputational Risk”....................................................................................884
(2) Lehman’s Repo 105 Practice Had a Material Impact on
Lehman’s Net Leverage Ratio ...................................................................888
(a) Lehman Significantly Expanded Its Repo 105 Practice in Late
2007 and Early 2008 ..............................................................................890
(3) Balance Sheet Targets for FID Businesses Were Unsustainable
Without the Use of Repo 105 Transactions .............................................899
(4) Rating Agencies Advised the Examiner that Lehman’s
Accounting Treatment and Use of Repo 105 Transactions to
Manage Its Net Leverage Ratio Would Have Been Relevant
Information ..................................................................................................902
(5) Government Regulators Had No Knowledge of Lehman’s Repo
105 Program.................................................................................................910
(a) Officials from the Federal Reserve Bank Would Have
Wanted to Know about Lehman’s Use of Repo 105
Transactions ...........................................................................................910
(b) Securities and Exchange Commission CSE Monitors Were
Unaware of Lehman’s Repo 105 Program.........................................913
h) Knowledge of Lehman’s Repo 105 Program at the Highest Levels of
the Firm ..............................................................................................................914
(1) Richard Fuld, Former Chief Executive Officer .......................................917
(2) Lehman’s Former Chief Financial Officers .............................................921
(a) Chris O’Meara, Former Chief Financial Officer ...............................921
(b) Erin Callan, Former Chief Financial Officer......................................930
(c) Ian Lowitt, Former Chief Financial Officer .......................................937
(3) Lehman’s Board of Directors.....................................................................945
i) Ernst & Young’s Knowledge of Lehman’s Repo 105 Program ..................948
(1) Ernst & Young’s Comfort with Lehman’s Repo 105 Accounting
Policy.............................................................................................................948
(2) The “Netting Grid” .....................................................................................951
(a) Quarterly Review and Audit...............................................................953
(3) Ernst & Young Would Not Opine on the Materiality of
Lehman’s Repo 105 Usage.........................................................................954

续6:
(4) Matthew Lee’s Statements Regarding Repo 105 to Ernst &
Young............................................................................................................956
(5) Accounting‐Motivated Transactions........................................................962
j) The Examiner’s Conclusions ...........................................................................962
(1) Materiality....................................................................................................963
(a) Whether Lehman’s Repo 105 Transactions Technically
Complied with SFAS 140 Does Not Impact Whether a
Colorable Claim Exists .........................................................................964
(2) Disclosure Requirements and Analysis ...................................................967
(a) Disclosure Obligations: Regulation S‐K and the MD&A...............968
(b) Duty to Disclose ....................................................................................972
(c) Lehman’s Public Filings .......................................................................973
(i) Summary of Lehman’s 2000 through 2007 Public Filings........974
(ii) Lehman’s 2007 Form 10‐K, First Quarter 2008 Form 10‐
Q, and Second Quarter 2008 Form 10‐Q.....................................977
a. Treatment of Repo Transactions and SFAS 140....................978
b. Net Leverage..............................................................................980
c. Derivatives .................................................................................981
d. A Reader of Lehman’s Forms 10‐K and 10‐Q Would
Not Have Been Able to Ascertain That Lehman
Engaged in Temporary Sales Using Liquid Securities ........984
(d) Conclusions Regarding Lehman’s Failure to Disclose ....................985
(3) Colorable Claims.........................................................................................990
(4) Fiduciary Duty Claims ...............................................................................991
(a) Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims against Board of Directors ........991
(b) Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims against Specific Lehman
Officers....................................................................................................992
(i) Richard Fuld ...................................................................................996
a. There Is Sufficient Evidence to Support a Finding By
the Trier of Fact That Fuld Was at Least Grossly
Negligent in Causing Lehman to File Misleading
Periodic Reports ........................................................................997
(ii) Chris O’Meara ..............................................................................1002
a. There Is Sufficient Evidence To Support a Colorable
Claim That O’Meara Was at Least Grossly Negligent
in Allowing Lehman to File Misleading Financial
Statements and Engage in Material Volumes of Repo
105 Transactions ......................................................................1007
b. There Is Sufficient Evidence To Support a Colorable
Claim That O’Meara Breached His Fiduciary Duties
by Failing to Inform the Board and His Superiors of
Lehman’s Repo 105 Practice ..................................................1009

(iii) Erin Callan ....................................................................................1013
a. There Is Sufficient Evidence To Support a Finding By
the Trier of Fact That Callan Breached Her Fiduciary
Duties by Causing Lehman to Make Materially
Misleading Statements ...........................................................1017
b. There Is Sufficient Evidence to Support a Colorable
Claim That Callan Breached Her Fiduciary Duty of
Care by Failing to Inform the Board of Directors of
Lehman’s Repo 105 Program ................................................1019
(iv) Ian Lowitt ......................................................................................1021
(c) Remedies ..............................................................................................1024
(5) Malpractice Claims Against Ernst & Young .........................................1027
(a) Background and Legal Standards ....................................................1028
(i) Professional Standards................................................................1028
(ii) Common Law Standards ............................................................1031
(b) There Is Sufficient Evidence to Support a Colorable Claim
That Ernst & Young Was Negligent.................................................1032
(i) Malpractice in Failure to Advise Audit Committee of
Repo 105 Activity and Lee’s Allegations..................................1033
(ii) Lehman’s 2008 Forms 10‐Q........................................................1040
(iii) Lehman’s 2007 Form 10‐K..........................................................1048
(iv) Effect on Prior Filings..................................................................1050
(v) Causation and Damages .............................................................1051
(c) Possible Defenses ................................................................................1053
VOLUME 4
Section III.A.5: Secured Lenders
5. Potential Claims Against Lehman’s Secured Lenders.....................................1066
a) Introduction and Executive Summary.........................................................1066
(1) JPMorgan....................................................................................................1068
(2) Citibank ......................................................................................................1073
(3) HSBC...........................................................................................................1077
(4) Other Lenders............................................................................................1080
(5) The Federal Reserve Bank of New York................................................1081
(6) Lehman’s Liquidity Pool..........................................................................1082
b) Lehman’s Dealings With JPMorgan.............................................................1084
(1) Facts.............................................................................................................1084
(a) Overview of JPMorgan‐Lehman Relationship ...............................1084
(b) Triparty Repo Prior to 2008 ...............................................................1089
(c) JPMorgan Restructures Its Approach to Triparty Risk .................1094
(d) Lehman Begins Posting Additional Collateral ...............................1101
(e) JPMorgan Concern Over Lehman Collateral in August 2008 ......1105
(f) The August Agreements ....................................................................1113
(g) Background to the September 9 Collateral Request and
September Agreements ......................................................................1125
(h) September 9 Calls Between Steven Black and Richard Fuld ........1138
(i) September Agreements ......................................................................1143
(j) Daily Liquidity Pool Updates From Lehman to JPMorgan..........1156
(k) September 11 Collateral Request Pursuant to the September
Agreements ..........................................................................................1158
(l) Additional Valuation Analyses by JPMorgan Beginning
September 11........................................................................................1165
(m) Lehman Requests for Return of Collateral.....................................1168
(2) Analysis of Potential Claims ...................................................................1172
(a) The Evidence Does Not Support a Colorable Claim Against
JPMorgan for Economic Duress........................................................1173
(i) Legal Background: Economic Duress .......................................1173
(ii) There Is No Available Evidence of an Express Unlawful
Threat Made by JPMorgan in Connection With the
Formation of the September Agreements ................................1174
(iii) The Available Evidence Suggests JPMorgan Did Not
Have an Improper Purpose........................................................1178
(iv) There Was a Degree of Negotiation Over the Terms of
the September Agreements ........................................................1181
(b) There Is Insufficient Evidence to Support a Colorable Claim
That the September Agreements Are Invalid for Lack of
Consideration ......................................................................................1183
(c) There is Sufficient Evidence to Support the Existence of a
Technical, But Not Colorable, Claim That the September
Agreements Are Invalid for Lack of Authority ..............................1186
(i) Tonucci May Have Acted With Apparent Authority.............1190
(ii) There Is Substantial Evidence That Lehman Ratified the
September Agreements...............................................................1193
(d) There Is Insufficient Evidence to Support a Colorable Claim
That JPMorgan Fraudulently Induced the September
Agreements ..........................................................................................1198
(e) There Is Insufficient Evidence to Support a Colorable Claim
for Breach of Contract of the September Agreements Based
on JPMorgan’s Refusal to Return Collateral ...................................1200
(i) Legal Background: Contractual Obligations Under
September Agreements...............................................................1200
(ii) There Was No Written Notice for Collateral Return ..............1208

下了看看吧。

续7:
(f) There Is Evidence to Support a Colorable, But Not Strong,
Claim That JPMorgan Breached the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing by Demanding Excessive
Collateral in September 2008.............................................................1210
(i) Legal Standards Governing Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing.................................................................1211
(ii) There Is Sufficient Evidence To Support a Colorable, But
Not a Strong, Claim That JPMorgan Violated the Implied
Covenant by Demanding Excessive Collateral .......................1214
(iii) A Trier of Fact Will Likely Have to Resolve a Waiver
Defense ..........................................................................................1220
c) Lehman’s Dealings With Citigroup..............................................................1224
(1) Facts.............................................................................................................1224
(a) Citigroup Provided Continuous Linked Settlement Service
and Other Clearing and Settlement Operations to Lehman.........1224
(i) Background Information on the Continuous Linked
Settlement Service Citi Provided to Lehman...........................1224
(ii) Other Clearing and Settlement Services That Citi
Provided to Lehman....................................................................1227
(iii) Citi’s Clearing and Settlement Exposure to Lehman,
Generally.......................................................................................1229
(iv) The Terms of Lehman’s CLS Agreement with Citi.................1231
(b) Lehman Provided a $2 Billion Cash Deposit with Citi on
June 12, 2008 To Support its Clearing Needs..................................1233
(i) The Market Environment and Other Circumstances
Surrounding Citi’s Request for the $2 Billion Cash
Deposit on June 12 .......................................................................1235
(ii) The Parties Did Not Share the Same Understanding of
the Terms of the $2 Billion Cash Deposit .................................1242
a. What Lehman Understood the Terms of the Deposit
To Be..........................................................................................1243
b. What Citi Understood the Terms of the Deposit To Be.....1245
c. The Exact Terms of the “Comfort Deposit” Are
Unknown Because the Terms Were Not Reduced to
Writing......................................................................................1250
(iii) Citi Knew the “Comfort Deposit” was Included in
Lehman’s Liquidity Pool ............................................................1250
(c) Collateral Pledge Discussions Between Lehman and Citi
Began in June 2008 and Continued Until September 2008 ...........1251
(i) The Unexecuted Pledge Agreement: the Parties Agreed
to Negotiate the Terms but Not Execute the Agreement
Until It Was Needed....................................................................1251
(ii) Citi Had Difficulty Pricing the Collateral Offered by
Lehman as a Substitute for the Cash Deposit..........................1254
(iii) The Guaranty Amendment Was Signed in a “Fire Drill”
on September 9, 2008...................................................................1261
a. Events Prior to the Signing of the September 9
Guaranty Amendment from Citi’s Perspective..................1263
b. Events Prior to the Signing of the September 9
Guaranty Amendment from Lehman’s Perspective..........1265
c. Negotiations Between Lehman and Citi Personnel
Regarding Which Lehman Entities Were To Be Added
to the Parent Guaranty by the September 9 Guaranty
Amendment.............................................................................1268
(iv) September 12, 2008: A Lehman Collateral Account at Citi
was Activated After Two Months of Discussion, and
Lehman Signed an Amendment to the Direct Custodial
Services Agreement .....................................................................1273
(d) Lehman’s Clearing Environment at Citi During the Week of
September 8, 2008................................................................................1276
(i) Citi Required Lehman To Operate Under Lower
Daylight Overdraft Limits..........................................................1276
(ii) Lehman Deposited Amounts in Excess of the $2 Billion
Deposit at Various Times in 2008 With Citi.............................1279
(iii) Citi Endeavored To Help Lehman in September 2008,
Prior to the Bankruptcy Filing ...................................................1281
(iv) Lehman’s Accounts at Citi Closed on Friday September
12 With Funds in Excess of the $2 Billion Deposit..................1284
(e) Citi’s Participation in “Lehman Weekend” Events........................1285
(f) Citi’s Actions Toward Lehman After Lehman Filed for
Bankruptcy Protection........................................................................1287
(i) Citi Continued to Provide CLS Services for Lehman, But
Not in an Entirely Uninterrupted Manner...............................1287
(ii) Prior to Lehman’s Bankruptcy Filing, Citi Set Off a
Portion of the Cash Deposit .......................................................1290
(2) Analysis of Potential Colorable Claims .................................................1291
(a) Validity of the September 9 Guaranty Amendment......................1291
(i) Economic Duress..........................................................................1291
a. Legal Framework ....................................................................1292
b. The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim Against Citi for Economic Duress ..........1293
(ii) The Failure of Consideration......................................................1297
a. Legal Framework ....................................................................1298
b. The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim Against Citi for Failure of
Consideration ..........................................................................1298
(b) Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
Connection With the CLS Services Agreement ..............................1300
(i) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim Against Citi for Breach of the Duty of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Connection With the
CLS Services Agreement.............................................................1301
d) Lehman’s Dealings With HSBC....................................................................1303
(1) Overview of HSBC’s Relationship With Lehman ................................1305
(a) HSBC Provided CREST Clearing and Settlement Services to
Lehman.................................................................................................1306
(b) Overview of the Operative Agreements..........................................1309
(2) The Examiner’s Investigation of Particular Transactions ...................1311
(a) HSBC Cancelled a $1 Billion Intraday Credit Facility ...................1311
(b) Lehman Maintained a $1 Billion Segregated Deposit with
HSBC.....................................................................................................1312
(c) Lehman Deposited $750 Million with HSBC on June 24...............1314
(d) Lehman Committed $25 Million on August 15 to HSBC’s
Syndicated Lending Facility..............................................................1315
(e) Lehman Pledged $6 Million to HSBC as Collateral for Letters
of Credit................................................................................................1317
(f) Other Significant Exposures..............................................................1318
(3) HSBC Required Lehman to Provide Approximately $1 Billion in
Collateral While Quietly Ending Their Relationship...........................1319
(a) HSBC Determined to End Its Relationship with Lehman.............1319
(b) HSBC Demanded Collateral for Intraday Credit ...........................1322
(c) HSBC Agreed To Accommodate Lehman at Quarter End ...........1325
(d) Lehman Deposited the Cash Collateral With HSBC......................1326
(e) Lehman Negotiated New Terms and Executed the Cash
Deeds ....................................................................................................1327
(i) Lehman Secured Concessions in the U.K. Cash Deeds..........1327
(ii) Lehman Executed the Hong Kong Cash Deed Late on
September 12 ................................................................................1329
(f) HSBC and LBHI Stipulated To Setoff and Return Some of the
Funds Covered by the U.K. Cash Deeds .........................................1332
(4) Other Issues Stemming from HSBC’s Collateral Demand..................1333
(a) Lehman Included the Deposits Covered by the Cash Deeds
in Its Reported Liquidity Pool...........................................................1333
(b) HSBC Considered Withholding Payments or Requiring
Prefunding of Trades in the Asia‐Pacific Region Prior to
Lehman’s Bankruptcy ........................................................................1336
(5) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of Colorable
Claims Arising From HSBC’s Demand That Lehman Provide
Cash Collateral and Execute Cash Deeds in Order for HSBC to
Continue Providing Clearing and Settlement Services .......................1336
(a) The Parameters of the Examiner’s Analysis....................................1336
(b) The Facts Provide Little to No Support for Invalidating the
U.K. Cash Deeds..................................................................................1339
(i) Analytical Framework ................................................................1339

续8:
a. English Law Governs Contract Claims Arising from
the U.K. Cash Deeds...............................................................1339
b. English Contract Law Treats Deeds Differently from
Other Contracts .......................................................................1340
(ii) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim That the U.K. Cash Deeds Are Invalid
for Want of Consideration..........................................................1341
(iii) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim for Economic Duress Because the
CREST Agreement Allowed HSBC To Cease Clearing
and Settlement at Its Absolute Discretion................................1343
a. Elements of Economic Duress...............................................1343
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1344
c. Other Transactions Do Not Give Rise to Economic
Duress Claims..........................................................................1346
(iv) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim that HSBC Violated a Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing by Demanding Cash Collateral .........1348
a. English Law Does Not Recognize a Principle of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing of General Application ..................1349
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1349
(v) The Evidence Does Not Support the Existence of a
Colorable Claim that HSBC Violated the Notice
Provision of the CREST Agreement..........................................1352
a. Construction of Terms............................................................1352
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1353
(vi) The Cash Deeds Were Not Contracts of Adhesion or
Standard Form Contracts............................................................1355
a. Characteristics of Standard Form Contracts or
Contracts of Adhesion............................................................1355
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1355
(c) Other Potential Theories of Liability................................................1357
(i) English Law Governs the Remaining Potential Claims
Even Though They Are Not Covered by the Choice‐of‐
Law Provision of the Cash Deeds..............................................1357
a. Analytical Framework............................................................1357
b. Application to Remaining Potential Claims........................1359
(ii) The Evidence Does Not Support The Existence Of a
Colorable Claim For Unjust Enrichment Because
Lehman Conveyed a Benefit on HSBC Pursuant to
Lehman’s Valid Contractual Obligations.................................1360
a. Elements of Unjust Enrichment ............................................1361
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1362
(iii) The Evidence Does Not Support a Colorable Claim That
HSBC Breached a Fiduciary Duty to Lehman Because
HSBC and Lehman Were Sophisticated Parties in a
Relationship Governed by an Agreement That Limited
HSBC’s Obligations .....................................................................1363
a. Elements of Breach of Fiduciary Duty and
Misappropriation ....................................................................1364
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1365
(iv) The Evidence Does Not Support a Colorable Claim that
HSBC’s Demand for Collateral Tortiously Interfered
With Lehman’s Other Business or Contracts Because
HSBC Was Acting To Protect Its Own Economic
Interests .........................................................................................1367
a. Elements of Tortious Interference ........................................1368
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1369
(v) The Evidence Does Not Support a Finding that HSBC
Fraudulently or Negligently Misrepresented Its Plan to
Withdraw ......................................................................................1371
a. Elements of Fraud and Misrepresentation ..........................1371
b. Application to Lehman Facts ................................................1373
e) Lehman’s Dealings With Bank of America .................................................1375
f) Lehman’s Dealings with Bank of New York Mellon .................................1376
(1) BNYM Demands and Receives a Collateral Deposit ...........................1377
(2) The Deposit Is Significant Because of Internal Lehman Concerns
About Including It in Its Pool..................................................................1379
g) Lehman’s Dealings With Standard Bank.....................................................1382
h) Lehman’s Dealings With the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ..........1385
(1) The FRBNY Supervises Deposit‐Taking Institutions and Assists
in Managing Monetary Policy, but Lacks Authority To Regulate
Investment Bank Holding Companies...................................................1385
(2) In Response to the Bear Stearns Near Collapse, the FRBNY
Created a Variety of Facilities To Backstop the Liquidity of
Broker‐Dealers; Lehman, In Turn, Drew on These Facilities..............1387
(a) The Primary Dealer Credit Facility ..................................................1387
(b) The Market Greeted the Creation of the PDCF as a Positive
Step Toward Backstopping Broker‐Dealer Liquidity, and as
Shoring Up Lehman’s Liquidity .......................................................1390
(c) In Addition to a Liquidity Backstop, Lehman Viewed the
PDCF as an Outlet for Its Illiquid Positions ....................................1392
(d) Lehman Was Reluctant to Draw on the PDCF Because of a
Perceived “Stigma” Attached to Borrowing from the Facility.....1396
(e) Lehman Accessed the PDCF Ten Times in 2008; Lehman’s
Use of the PDCF Was Concentrated in Periods Immediately
After the Bear Stearns Near Collapse, and Immediately After
LBHI Filed for Bankruptcy ................................................................1398
(3) Other FRBNY Liquidity Facilities ...........................................................1400
(a) The Term Secured Lending Facility .................................................1400
(b) Open Markets Operations..................................................................1401
i) Lehman’s Liquidity Pool................................................................................1401
(1) Introduction and Executive Summary...................................................1401
(2) The Importance of Liquidity to Broker‐Dealers and Investment
Bank Holding Companies Generally .....................................................1406
(3) Lehman’s Liquidity Pool..........................................................................1408
(a) The Purpose and Composition of Lehman’s Liquidity Pool ........1408
(b) Lehman Tested Its Liquidity Pool and Shared the Results of
These Tests with Rating Agencies ....................................................1413
(c) Market Participants Formed Favorable Opinions of
Lehman’s Liquidity on the Basis of Lehman’s
Representations About Its Liquidity Pool .......................................1415
(4) Lehman’s Clearing Banks Sought Collateral Pledges and Cash
Deposits To Secure Intraday Credit Risk; Lehman Included This
Collateral in Its Liquidity Pool................................................................1417
(a) Lehman Pledged CLOs and Other Securities to JPMorgan
Throughout the Summer of 2008 to Meet Triparty‐Repo
Margin Requirements.........................................................................1417
(b) The Securities Posted to Meet JPMorgan’s Margin
Requirements Were Included in Lehman’s Liquidity Pool ..........1422
(c) On June 12, 2008, Lehman Transferred $2 Billion to Citi as
“Comfort” for Continuing CLS Settlement .....................................1424
(d) The Citi “Comfort Deposit” Was Included in Lehman’s
Liquidity Pool ......................................................................................1430
(e) On August 25, 2008, Lehman Executed a Security Agreement
with Bank of America, Granting the Bank a Security Interest
in a $500 Million Deposit ...................................................................1433
(f) LBHI and JPMorgan Executed an Amendment to the June
2000 Clearance Agreement, a Security Agreement and a
Holding Company Guaranty, all Dated August 26, 2008 .............1436
(g) Lehman Assets Subject to the August Security Agreement
Were Included in Lehman’s Liquidity Pool....................................1439
(h) September 2, 2008: Lehman Transferred Just Under $1 Billion
to HSBC to Continue Clearing Operations, and Encumbered
This with “Cash Deeds” Executed on September 9 and
September 12........................................................................................1441
(i) The HSBC Deposit Was Represented as “Liquid” and Was
Included in LBHI’s Liquidity Pool ...................................................1446
(j) Lehman and JPMorgan Executed Another Round of Security
Documentation Dated September 9, 2008; Lehman Made $3.6
Billion and $5 Billion Pledges to JPMorgan Subject to the
Terms of These Agreements..............................................................1446
(k) Lehman Made a Deposit to Bank of New York Mellon to
Cover Intraday Exposure, and Included That Deposit in Its
Liquidity Pool ......................................................................................1448
(l) The Cumulative Impact of Lehman’s Inclusion of Clearing‐
Bank Collateral and Deposits in Its Liquidity Pool........................1450

续9:
(5) Disclosures Concerning the Inclusion of Clearing‐Bank
Collateral in Lehman’s Liquidity Pool...................................................1454
(a) Lehman Did Not Disclose on Its June 16, 2008 Second
Quarter Earnings Call That It Was Including the $2 Billion
Citi “Comfort Deposit” in Its Liquidity Pool..................................1454
(b) Lehman Did Not Disclose in Its Second Quarter 2008 10‐Q,
Filed July 10, 2008, That It Was Including Both the $2 Billion
Citibank “Comfort Deposit” and Approximately $5.5 Billion
of Securities Collateral Pledged to JPMorgan in Its Liquidity
Pool........................................................................................................1455
(c) Lehman Did Not Disclose On Its September 10, 2008
Earnings Call That a Substantial Portion of Its Liquidity Pool
Was Encumbered by Clearing‐Bank Pledges .................................1457
(d) Senior Executives Did Not Disclose to the Board of Directors
at the September 9, 2008 Finance Committee Meeting the
Fact That a Substantial Portion of Its Liquidity Pool Was
Encumbered by Clearing‐Bank Pledges ..........................................1460
(e) Lehman Officers Did Not Disclose to the Board of Directors
That Its Liquidity Position Was Substantially Impaired by
Collateral Held at Clearing Banks Until the Evening of
September 14, 2008..............................................................................1464
(f) Lowitt’s Views on Including Clearing‐Bank Collateral in the
Liquidity Pool ......................................................................................1466
(6) Rating Agencies Were Unaware That Lehman Was Including
Clearing‐Bank Collateral in Its Liquidity Pool .....................................1467
(a) Fitch.......................................................................................................1467
(b) Standard & Poor’s ...............................................................................1468
(c) Moody’s................................................................................................1469
(7) The FRBNY Did Not View the Clearing‐Bank Collateral in the
Liquidity Pool as “Unencumbered”.......................................................1469
(8) The SEC, Lehman’s Primary Regulator, Was Unaware of the
Extent to Which Lehman Was Including Clearing‐Bank
Collateral in Its Liquidity Pool; to the Extent It Was Aware, the
SEC Did Not View This Practice as Proper...........................................1472
(9) Certain Lehman Counsel Were Aware That Agreements with Its
Clearing Banks Were Structured to Include Clearing‐Bank
Collateral in Its Liquidity Pool, but Disclaimed Knowledge
Concerning What Assets Were Appropriate or Inappropriate for
the Liquidity Pool .....................................................................................1476
(10) Lehman’s Auditors Monitored Lehman’s Liquidity Pool, but
Viewed the Composition of the Pool as a Regulatory Issue...............1478
(11) There Is Insufficient Evidence To Support a Determination
That Any Officer or Director Breached a Fiduciary Duty in
Connection With the Public Disclosure of Lehman’s Liquidity
Pool..............................................................................................................1479
VOLUME 4 (CONT.)
Section III.A.6: Government
6. The Interaction Between Lehman and the Government .................................1482
a) Introduction .....................................................................................................1482
b) The SEC’s Oversight of Lehman...................................................................1484
(1) The CSE Program......................................................................................1484
(2) Lehman’s Participation in the CSE Program ........................................1487
(3) The SEC/OIG Findings .............................................................................1490
(4) The View From the Top ...........................................................................1492
c) The FRBNY’s Oversight of Lehman.............................................................1494
d) The Federal Reserve’s Oversight of Lehman ..............................................1502
e) The Treasury Department’s Oversight of Lehman....................................1505
f) The Relationship of the SEC and FRBNY in Monitoring Lehman’s
Liquidity...........................................................................................................1507
(1) The SEC Performed Only Limited Monitoring of Lehman’s
Liquidity Pool ............................................................................................1508
(2) The SEC and FRBNY Did Not Always Share Information About
Lehman.......................................................................................................1511
g) The Government’s Preparation for the “Lehman Weekend”
Meetings at the FRBNY..................................................................................1516
h) On the Evening of Friday, September 12, 2008, the Government
Convened a Meeting of the Major Wall Street Firms in an Attempt
to Facilitate the Rescue of Lehman...............................................................1523
i) Lehman’s Bankruptcy Filing .........................................................................1535
VOLUME 5
Section III.B: Avoidance Actions
B. Are There Administrative Claims or Colorable Claims for Preferences or
Voidable Transfers......................................................................................................1544
1. Executive Summary..............................................................................................1544
2. Examiner’s Investigation of Possible Administrative Claims Against
LBHI (First Bullet).................................................................................................1546
a) Summary..........................................................................................................1546
b) Introduction .....................................................................................................1547
c) Lehman’s Cash Management System ..........................................................1549
(1) LBHI’s Role as Central Banker................................................................1550
(2) Global Cash and Collateral Management .............................................1551
(3) Lehman’s External and Virtual Bank Accounts....................................1554
(4) Bank Account Reconciliations.................................................................1560
d) Effect of the Bankruptcy on the Cash Management System.....................1562
e) Cash Transfers Giving Rise to Administrative Claims..............................1564
(1) Cash Transfers from LBHI Affiliates to LBHI.......................................1565
(2) Cash Received by LBHI on Behalf of LBHI Affiliates..........................1566
(3) Other Relevant Transactions ...................................................................1568
3. Examiner’s Investigation of Possible Avoidance Actions (Third, Fourth
and Eighth Bullets)................................................................................................1570
a) Summary..........................................................................................................1570
b) LBHI Solvency Analysis.................................................................................1570
(1) Introduction ...............................................................................................1570
(2) Market‐Based Valuation Analysis ..........................................................1573
(a) Basis for Utilization of a Market‐Based Valuation Analysis.........1573
(b) Market Value of Assets Approach....................................................1577
(i) Implied Asset Value ....................................................................1578
(ii) Small Equity Cushion..................................................................1580
(iii) Limitations of the Market‐Based Approach.............................1581
a. Application of Retrojection....................................................1583
b. The Application of “Current Awareness”...........................1584
(3) Conclusion .................................................................................................1587
c) LBHI Affiliate Solvency Analysis .................................................................1587
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1587
(2) Description of the Examiner’s Analysis.................................................1595
(3) Debtor‐by‐Debtor Analysis .....................................................................1610
(a) Lehman Commercial Paper Inc.........................................................1610
(b) CES Aviation, CES Aviation V LLC, CES Aviation IX ..................1615
(c) LB Special Financing...........................................................................1618
(d) LB Commodity Services.....................................................................1622
(e) Luxembourg Residential Properties Loan Finance S.A.R.L..........1627
(f) LB OTC Derivatives............................................................................1628
(g) LB 745 LLC...........................................................................................1629
(h) LB Derivative Products ......................................................................1631

续10:
(i) LB Financial Products.........................................................................1633
(j) LB Commercial Corporation .............................................................1635
(k) BNC Mortgage LLC............................................................................1638
(l) East Dover Limited .............................................................................1638
(m) Lehman Scottish Finance ..................................................................1640
(n) PAMI Statler Arms..............................................................................1641
d) Unreasonably Small Capital..........................................................................1642
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1645
(2) Analysis of the “Unreasonably Small Capital” Test ............................1648
(a) Summary of Legal Standard..............................................................1648
(b) Lehman’s Countercyclical Strategy..................................................1650
(c) Lehman’s Repo Book and Liquidity Risk........................................1654
(i) Bear Stearns Demonstrates the Liquidity Risk Associated
With Repo Financing...................................................................1656

(ii) Quality and Tenor of Lehman’s Repo Book.............................1658
(d) Deleveraging to “Win Back” Market Confidence ..........................1662
(e) Beginning in the Third Quarter of 2008, Lehman Could Have
Reasonably Anticipated a Loss of Confidence Which Would
Have Triggered Its Liquidity Risk....................................................1665
(f) Lehman Was Not Sufficiently Prepared to Absorb a
Liquidity Crisis Marked by a Sudden Loss of Non‐
Government, Non‐Agency Repo Funding ......................................1674
(i) Lehman’s Liquidity Pool ............................................................1675
(ii) Liquidity Stress Tests ..................................................................1678
(iii) Other Capital Adequacy Metrics...............................................1687
a. Cash Capital Surplus ..............................................................1687
b. Equity Adequacy Framework...............................................1688
c. CSE Capital Ratio....................................................................1690
(g) LBHI Affiliate “Unreasonably Small Capital” Analysis................1692
e) Insider Preferences Against LBHI (Third Bullet) .......................................1694
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1694
(2) Legal Summary .........................................................................................1696
(3) Sources of Potential Preferential Activity..............................................1698
(4) Determinations and Assumptions on Section 547(b) Elements .........1705
(5) Scope of Defenses Under Section 547(c) ................................................1710
(6) Findings for LBSF......................................................................................1713
(7) Findings for LBCS.....................................................................................1718
(8) Findings for LCPI......................................................................................1722
f) Preferences Against Non‐LBHI Lehman Affiliates (Fourth Bullet).........1730
g) Avoidance Analysis of LBHI and LBHI Affiliates Against Financial
Participants and Pre‐Chapter 11 Lenders (Fourth and Eighth
Bullets) ..............................................................................................................1731
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1731
(2) APB Analysis .............................................................................................1734
(3) Cash Disbursement Analysis ..................................................................1737
(4) Pledged Collateral Accounts Analysis...................................................1738
(5) Avoidance Analysis for Certain Pre‐Chapter 11 Lenders and
Financial Participants ...............................................................................1739
(a) JPMorgan Avoidance Analysis .........................................................1739
(i) Background...................................................................................1739
(ii) Avoidability of the September Agreements and
Transfers in Connection with the September Agreements....1742
a. Avoidability of the September Guaranty as a
Constructive Fraudulent Obligation ....................................1743
1. There Is Evidence To Support A Finding That
LBHI Incurred an Obligation Within the
Applicable Look‐Back Periods When it Executed
the September Guaranty ..................................................1743
2. There Is Evidence To Support A Finding That
LBHI Received Less Than Reasonably Equivalent
Value or Did Not Receive Fair Consideration in
Exchange for Granting JPMorgan the September
Guaranty.............................................................................1744
3. Insolvency as of September 10, 2008 ..............................1757
4. Undercapitalization as of September 10, 2008 ..............1758
b. Defenses to Avoidability of the September Guaranty.......1758
1. Applicability of the Good Faith Defense of Section
548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and Section 279 of
the N.Y. Debtor Creditor Law to the September
Guaranty.............................................................................1758
2. Applicability of the Safe‐Harbor Provisions to the
September Guaranty.........................................................1762
c. Avoidability of Transfers of Collateral in Connection
with the September Guaranty ...............................................1767
1. LBHI’s Collateral Transfers and Post‐Petition
Setoffs..................................................................................1767
2. Application Of The Safe Harbors To The $8.6
Billion Cash Collateral Transfers ....................................1776
3. There Is Evidence To Support Potential State Law
Claims Available to LBHI Pursuant to Section 541
to Avoid the Transfers In Connection with the
September Guaranty.........................................................1781
4. To the Extent the September Guaranty Provided
for a Guaranty of Non‐Protected Contract
Obligations, Or to the Extent JPMorgan
Liquidated Collateral Pursuant to Non‐Protected
Contract Exposure, a Colorable Basis Exists that
the Safe‐Harbor Provisions are not Applicable ............1787
(iii) Avoidability of the August Agreements and Transfers in
Connection with the August Agreements................................1794
a. Avoidability of the August Guaranty as a
Constructive Fraudulent Obligation ....................................1794
1. LBHI Incurred an Obligation Within the
Applicable Look‐Back Periods When it Executed
the August Guaranty........................................................1794
2. There Is Evidence That LBHI Received Less Than
Reasonably Equivalent Value or Did Not Receive
Fair Consideration in Exchange for Granting
JPMorgan the August Guaranty .....................................1795
3. Insolvency as of August 29, 2008....................................1797
4. Undercapitalization and Inability to Pay Debts as
They Come Due as of August 29, 2008 ..........................1797
b. Defenses to Avoidability of the August Guaranty.............1797
c. Avoidability of Transfers of Collateral in Connection
With the August Guaranty ....................................................1798
(iv) Avoidability of the August and the September Security
Agreements And Collateral Transfers Pursuant to
Section 548(a)(1)(A) .....................................................................1801
(v) Avoidability of the Transfers of Collateral in Connection
with the September Guaranty Pursuant to Section 547(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code ..............................................................1806
(vi) Avoidability of Obligations of LBHI to Funds Managed
by JPMorgan.................................................................................1813
(b) Citi Avoidance Analysis ....................................................................1817
(i) Background...................................................................................1817
(ii) Avoidability of the $2 Billion Deposit ......................................1821
(iii) Avoidability of the Amended Guaranty ..................................1821
(iv) Avoidability of the $500 Million Transfer From an LBHI
Account to an LBI Account ........................................................1827

续11:
(c) FRBNY Avoidance Analysis..............................................................1829
(d) HSBC Avoidance Analysis ................................................................1830
(i) Background...................................................................................1830
(ii) The U.K. Cash Deed Transactions.............................................1832
(iii) The Hong Kong Cash Deposit Transactions............................1833
(iv) September 9, 2009 Stipulation ....................................................1834
(v) Avoidability of the January 4, 2008 Guaranty .........................1835
(vi) Avoidability of the Hong Kong Cash Deed Transactions......1836
(vii) Avoidability of the U.K. Cash Deed.........................................1836
(viii) Avoidability of the Transfer of the Remaining
Collateral .......................................................................................1837
(e) Standard Bank Avoidance Analysis.................................................1837
(f) BNYM Avoidance Analysis...............................................................1839
(g) BofA Avoidance Analysis..................................................................1840
(h) CME Avoidance Analysis..................................................................1841
(i) Summary.......................................................................................1841
(ii) Background...................................................................................1843
a. Energy Derivatives .................................................................1851
b. FX Derivatives .........................................................................1852
c. Interest Rate Derivatives........................................................1852
d. Equity Derivatives ..................................................................1853
e. Agricultural Derivatives ........................................................1854
(iii) Defenses to Avoidability of Claims...........................................1855
a. Applicability of CEA Preemption.........................................1855
b. Applicability of Self‐Regulatory Organization
Immunity..................................................................................1862
c. Applicability of the Safe Harbor Provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code ....................................................................1870
h) Avoidance Analysis of LBHI Affiliate Payments to Insider
Employees (Fourth Bullet).............................................................................1871
(1) Summary....................................................................................................1871
(2) Methodology..............................................................................................1873
(3) Applicable Legal Standards.....................................................................1874
(4) Findings......................................................................................................1882
(a) LBHI Affiliate Severance Payments .................................................1882
(b) LBHI Affiliate Bonus Payments........................................................1887
(c) LBHI’s Assumptions of Limited Partnership Interests..................1889
4. Examiner’s Investigation of Possible Breaches of Fiduciary Duty by
LBHI Affiliate Directors and Officers (Fifth Bullet) .........................................1894
a) Fiduciary Duty Standard for a Wholly‐Owned Affiliate Subsidiary
under Delaware Law......................................................................................1896
b) Fiduciary Duty Standard for a Wholly‐Owned Affiliate Subsidiary
under New York Law.....................................................................................1902
(1) LCPI’s Background and Officers and Directors ..................................1905
(a) Duty of Care.........................................................................................1907
(b) Duty to Monitor ..................................................................................1909
c) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Aiding or Abetting Under Delaware
Law....................................................................................................................1911
5. Examiner’s Analysis of Lehman’s Foreign Exchange Transactions
(Second Bullet).......................................................................................................1912
a) Summary..........................................................................................................1912
b) Foreign Exchange at Lehman........................................................................1913
c) Foreign Exchange Transactions During the Stub Period ..........................1923
6. Examiner’s Review of Intercompany Transactions Within Thirty Days
of LBHI’s Bankruptcy Filing (Seventh Bullet) ..................................................1938
a) Summary..........................................................................................................1938
b) Discussion ........................................................................................................1939
c) Analysis ............................................................................................................1942
d) Analysis of Overall Net Intercompany Data for the 2007 and 2008
Periods of Analysis .........................................................................................1942
(1) LBHI............................................................................................................1942
(2) LBIE.............................................................................................................1945
(3) LBSF ............................................................................................................1947
e) Analysis of Net Daily Intercompany Data for the 2007 and 2008
Periods of Analysis .........................................................................................1949
7. Examiner’s Analysis of Lehman’s Debt to Freddie Mac .................................1951
VOLUME 5 (CONT.)
Section III.C: Barclays Transaction
C. Do Colorable Claims Arise From Transfers of LBHI Affiliate Assets to
Barclays, or From the Lehman ALI Transaction?...................................................1961
1. Executive Summary..............................................................................................1961
a) Purpose of Investigation ................................................................................1961
(1) Barclays Sale Transaction.........................................................................1961
(2) Lehman ALI Transaction .........................................................................1963
b) Summary of Conclusions...............................................................................1963
(1) Barclays Transaction.................................................................................1963
(2) Lehman ALI Transaction .........................................................................1965
2. Facts.........................................................................................................................1965
a) Lehman Businesses and Assets.....................................................................1965
(1) LBHI Affiliate Operating Companies ....................................................1970
(a) LBCS......................................................................................................1970
(b) LBCC.....................................................................................................1972
(c) LCPI ......................................................................................................1975
(d) LBSF ......................................................................................................1978
(e) LOTC.....................................................................................................1980
(f) LBDP and LBFP...................................................................................1981
(g) LBF ........................................................................................................1984
(h) BNC.......................................................................................................1986
(2) LBHI Affiliate Single Purpose Entities...................................................1987
(a) LB 745....................................................................................................1987
(b) CES Aviation Entities .........................................................................1987
(c) PAMI Statler ........................................................................................1988
(d) East Dover............................................................................................1988
(e) Scottish Finance...................................................................................1989
(f) Luxembourg S.A.R.L. .........................................................................1989
(g) Navigator .............................................................................................1990
(3) Sale Transaction.........................................................................................1991
(未完待续)

太感谢楼主了，希望楼主有中文版的时候也发上来。

续12:


3. Whether Assets of LBHI Affiliates Were Transferred to Barclays.................1997
a) Analysis of Securities Transferred to Barclays ...........................................1998
(1) Securities Transferred to Barclays ..........................................................1999
(a) Lehman’s Securities Trading Records and Systems ......................2005
(i) General ..........................................................................................2005
(ii) GFS System Assessment .............................................................2008
a. Comparison of GFS Data to Lehman’s 10‐Q Filings ..........2009
b. Comparison of GFS Data to Lehman’s General Ledger....2009
c. Reliability of September 12 Data...........................................2010

(iii) GFS Data Extracted by Examiner ..............................................2010
(2) Analysis of GFS Data................................................................................2012
(a) CUSIPs Not Associated With LBHI Affiliate Entities....................2014
(b) CUSIPs Associated Solely With an LBHI Affiliate Entity .............2015

(c) CUSIPs Associated With Both LBI and LBHI Affiliate
Entities ..................................................................................................2016
(i) CUSIPs Associated With Subordinated Entities .....................2016
(ii) Securities Financing Transactions .............................................2021
(iii) Alternative Analyses ...................................................................2024
(d) 817 CUSIPs With No GFS Data.........................................................2025
(i) September 19, 2008 GFS Dataset................................................2026
(ii) Search by ISIN Number and Product ID..................................2027

(iii) TMS Source System .....................................................................2027
(iv) Additional Data Sources.............................................................2028
b) Analysis of Tangible Asset Transfers...........................................................2030
(1) LB 745..........................................................................................................2033
(2) LBCS............................................................................................................2035
(3) LCPI ............................................................................................................2036
(4) LBSF ............................................................................................................2038
(5) CES ..............................................................................................................2039
(6) CES V ..........................................................................................................2041
(7) CES IX .........................................................................................................2042
c) Analysis of Intangible Asset Transfers ........................................................2044
(1) Customer Information Assets .................................................................2045
(2) Proprietary Software ................................................................................2051
(3) Assembled Workforce ..............................................................................2054
4. Lehman ALI Transaction .....................................................................................2055
5. Conclusions............................................................................................................2063
a) Summary..........................................................................................................2063
b) Colorable Claims Arising from Transfer of LBHI Assets..........................2064
(1) There Are No Colorable Claims Against Barclays Arising from
Transfer of LBHI Affiliate Securities ......................................................2064
(2) There Are Colorable, Limited Claims Against Barclays Arising
from Transfer of LBHI Affiliate Office Equipment and LBCS
Customer Information..............................................................................2076
(a) Bankruptcy Code Claims ...................................................................2077
(i) Section 542.....................................................................................2077
(ii) Section 548.....................................................................................2081
(b) Common Law Claims.........................................................................2083
(i) Recovery of Chattel .....................................................................2083
(ii) Conversion....................................................................................2086
(iii) Unjust Enrichment.......................................................................2088
(iv) Trade Secret Misappropriation..................................................2090
(v) Unfair Competition .....................................................................2092
(vi) Tortious Interference With Employment Relations................2094
(3) Claims Against LBHI Affiliate Officers and Directors ........................2096
(a) Duty of Care.........................................................................................2098
(b) Duty of Good Faith .............................................................................2100
(c) Duty to Monitor ..................................................................................2101
c) Lehman ALI Transaction ...............................................................................2103
6. Barclays Transaction.............................................................................................2103
a) Pre‐Bankruptcy Negotiations........................................................................2104
(1) Barclays’ Interest in a Transaction Involving Lehman........................2104
(2) Negotiations Before September 15 .........................................................2110
b) LBHI Bankruptcy ............................................................................................2116
(1) LBHI Files Chapter 11 ..............................................................................2116
(2) Post‐Petition Clearing and Financing ....................................................2116
c) Negotiations Leading to APA.......................................................................2124
(1) Participants ................................................................................................2127
(2) Structure of Transaction...........................................................................2129
(3) Negotiations Regarding Securities Positions to be Purchased by
Barclays.......................................................................................................2131
(a) On September 15 and 16, Lehman and Barclays Review
Lehman’s Securities Positions and Marks.......................................2131
(b) Barclays Agrees to Purchase “Long” Securities Positions
With a Book Value of “Approximately $70 Billion” ......................2138
(4) Negotiations Regarding Contract Cure and Employee
Compensation Liabilities .........................................................................2143
(a) Contract Cure Costs............................................................................2143
(b) Compensation Liabilities ...................................................................2147
d) Consideration and Approval of Transaction Described in APA by
LBHI and LBI Boards of Directors................................................................2153
e) Transaction Described to the Court on September 17 ...............................2155
(1) Sale Motion ................................................................................................2155
(2) September 17 Sale Procedures Hearing.................................................2157
f) Between September 17 and 19, the Securities Positions Being
Acquired by Barclays Change.......................................................................2160
(1) The “Replacement Transaction” .............................................................2160
(2) $15.8 Billion Repo......................................................................................2170
(3) September 19 Agreement to Transfer Additional Assets....................2175
(a) Excess 15c3‐3 Assets ...........................................................................2178
(b) Additional Securities ..........................................................................2182
(c) OCC Margin.........................................................................................2184
g) The Court’s Consideration and Approval of the Proposed
Transaction.......................................................................................................2188
(1) September 19, 2008 Sale Hearing............................................................2188
(2) The Sale Order...........................................................................................2192
h) Transaction Closing ........................................................................................2194
(1) JPMorgan/Barclays Disputes...................................................................2194
(2) The Committee’s Role ..............................................................................2197
(3) December 2008 Settlement Between Trustee, Barclays and
JPMorgan....................................................................................................2208
(目录全部结束)

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