TIMOTHY BESLEY AND TORSTEN PERSSON: State Capacity, Conflict, and Development . . . 1
MATTHEW GENTZKOW AND JESSE M. SHAPIRO: What Drives Media Slant? Evidence From
U.S. Daily Newspapers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
BRUNO BIAIS, THOMAS MARIOTTI, JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, AND STÉPHANE VILLENEUVE:
Large Risks, Limited Liability, and DynamicMoralHazard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
DONALD W. K. ANDREWS AND GUSTAVO SOARES: Inference for Parameters Defined by
Moment Inequalities Using GeneralizedMoment Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
GARY CHAMBERLAIN: Binary Response Models for Panel Data: Identification and
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
JOSEPH P. ROMANO AND AZEEM M. SHAIKH: Inference for the Identified Set in Partially
Identified EconometricModels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
MARK ARMSTRONG AND JOHN VICKERS: AModel of Delegated Project Choice. . . . . . . . . . 213
RENÉ CALDENTEY AND ENNIO STACCHETTI: Insider Trading With a Random Deadline . . . 245
DAVID RAHMAN AND ICHIRO OBARA: Mediated Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
ALESSANDRO CITANNA AND PAOLO SICONOLFI: Recursive Equilibrium in Stochastic
Overlapping-Generations Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
NOTES AND COMMENTS:
JOHN E. STOVALL: Multiple Temptations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
PEDRO CARNEIRO, JAMES J. HECKMAN, AND EDWARD VYTLACIL: Evaluating Marginal
Policy Changes and the Average Effect of Treatment for Individuals at the
Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
BRENDAN K. BEARE: Copulas and Temporal Dependence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395