Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them
2010-08-24
1。 这本书我于2010年4月24日在论坛发布求书信息,没有得到。今日在胡佛研究院整理下载;速传上给大家。
2。全书章节都是原书,但是目录系我所加,并附加了一个书评,以及该书内容的来源——2009年胡佛研讨会的日程表,以供大家参考。PDF。
3。所以,这本书并非完全“原版”,敬请各位注意!!!
March 15, 2010
by Nicholas F. Brady; Darrell Duffie; Joseph A. Grundfest; Richard
J. Herring; Thomas M. Hoenig; Thomas Jackson; William F. Kroener III; Charles S. Morris; Kenneth E. Scott; George P. Shultz; Kenneth Spong; Johannes Stroebel; Kimberly Anne Summe; John B. Taylor; and Paul Volcker
edited by Kenneth E. Scott; George P. Shultz; and John B. Taylor
The American people are clearly upset about the massive government bailouts of faltering organizations and the consequent commitment of taxpayer dollars-as well as the heavy involvement of the federal government in private sector activities. How do we approach a problem of this magnitude? The key question, which George Shultz presents at the outset, is: How do we make failure tolerable? In other words, if clear and credible measures can be put into place that convince everybody that failure will be allowed, then the expectations of bailouts will recede and perhaps even disappear. Perhaps more important, we would also get rid of the risk-inducing behavior that even implicit government guarantees bring about. In Ending Government Bailouts as We Know Them, a team of expert contributors examine the dangers of continuing government bailouts and offer constructive alternatives designed to both resolve the current bailout problem and prevent future crises.
The other contributors follow up on Shultz's premise with discussions on a range of key topics. They begin with the nature of systemic risk-particularly in the experience of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy-and the reforms that financial firms can implement, whether or not required by government regulatory agencies. They also explore in detail the two main alternatives to government bailouts in the case of a failing financial firm: bankruptcy versus resolution authority.
The book concludes with a summary of the commentary on the chapters by formal discussants and the audience at the conference, ranging from constructive critiques to strong endorsements to ideas for future research.
•Preface…………………………………………………………………………………...IX
•Acknowledgments ………………………………………………………………………Xiii
•Make Failure Tolerable………………………………………………………………….3
•Financial Reforms to End Government Bailouts as We Know Them ………………….11
•Fifty Years in the Business: From Wall Street to the Treasury and Beyond ……………21
•Defining Systematic Rish Operationally ……………………………………………….33
•Lessons Learned from the Lehman Bankruptcy ………………………………………..59
•A Contractual Approach to Restructuring Financial Institutions ……………………….109
•Wind-down Plans as an Alternative to Bailouts: The Cross-Border Challenges ……….125
•Wind-down Plans, Incomplete Contracting, and Renegotiation Risk: Lessons from
Tiger Woods……………………………………………………………………………163
•Expanding FDIC-Style Resolution Authority …………………………………………..179
•The Kansas City Plan……………………………………………………………………189
•Chapter 11F: A Proposal for the Use of Bankruptcy to Resolve Financial Institutions…217
•Evaluating Failure Resolution Plans ……………………………………………………253
•A Summary of the Commentary ………………………………………………………..263
•A Conversation about Key Conclusions ………………………………………………..285
•Appendix: The Financial Crisis: Causes and Lessons ………………………………….291
•About the Authors……………………………………………………………………….313
•Index …………………………………………………………………………………….323
Ending Government Bailouts as We Know Them
Editors: Kenneth E. Scott, George P. Shultz, John B. Taylor
ISBN: 978-0-8179-1124-9
Pub Date:
March 15, 2010
Product Format: Cloth
Availability: In stock.
Price: $19.95
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Published by Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, USA.