指数基金与公司治理的未来：理论，证据和政策

INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY

作者：

露西安·A·贝克丘克（Lucian A. Bebchuk）

斯科特·赫斯特（Scott Hirst）

We seek to contribute to understanding index fund stewardship by providing a comprehensivetheoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of such stewardship. We put forward an agency-costtheory of the stewardship decisions that index fund managers make. Our agency-costs analysisshows that index fund managers have strong incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii)defer excessively to the preferences and positions of corporate managers. We also undertake anempirical analysis of the full range of stewardship activities that index funds do and do notundertake. We show that the body of evidence is, on the whole, consistent with the incentiveissues identified by our agency-costs framework. Finally, we explain how our analysis shouldreorient important ongoing debates regarding common ownership and hedge fund activism.
我们试图通过提供对此类基金管理的全面理论，经验和政策分析，为理解指数基金的管理做出贡献。我们提出了指数基金经理做出的管理决策的代理成本理论。我们的代理成本分析表明，指数基金经理具有强烈的动机来（i）对管理的投资不足和（ii）过分地屈从于公司经理的偏好和职位。我们还对指数基金从事和不从事的全部管理活动进行了实证分析。我们表明，总体而言，证据与我们的机构成本框架所确定的激励问题相一致。最后，我们解释了我们的分析应如何重新定位有关共同所有权和对冲基金行动主义的重要辩论。