ARTICLES

Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers
Are Loss Averse
INGOLF DITTMANN, ERNST MAUG, and OLIVER SPALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2015
Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from
Structural Estimation
LUCIAN A. TAYLOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2051
The Cost of Debt
JULES H. VAN BINSBERGEN, JOHN R. GRAHAM, and JIE YANG. . . . . . . . . . . 2089
The Net Benefits to Leverage
ARTHUR KORTEWEG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2137
Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads
and Capital Structure
HUI CHEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2171
Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
ALEXANDER DYCK, ADAIR MORSE, and LUIGI ZINGALES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2213
Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs
TRACY YUE WANG, ANDREW WINTON, and XIAOYUN YU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2255
Collateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity
ADRIANO A. RAMPINI and S. VISWANATHAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2293
Leverage Choice and Credit Spreads when Managers Risk Shift
MURRAY CARLSON and ALI LAZRAK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2323
Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors
LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, YANIV GRINSTEIN, and URS PEYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2363
Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment, and Strategic Inertia
CATHERINE CASAMATTA and ALEXANDER GUEMBEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2403
MISCELLANEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2437