Papers to appear
The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.
Sean Horan and Yves Sprumont, Two-stage majoritarian choice
Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Censorship as optimal persuasion
Efe A. Ok and Gerelt Tserenjigmid, Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation and stochastic choice
Laura Doval, Dynamically stable matching
Sebastian Gryglewicz and Aaron Kolb, Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes
Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno, Bayesian comparative statics
Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Christina Thysen, Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations (Supplementary appendix)
Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, and William Phan, Family ties: school assignment with siblings
Chad Fulton, Choosing what to pay attention to
Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione, and Shengxing Zhang, Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs
Afshin Nikzad, Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann, Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Chen Zhao, Pseudo-Bayesian updating
Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella, and Francesco Carli, Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing
William A. Branch, Bruce McGough, and Mei Zhu, Statistical sunspots
Juan Carlos Cordoba and Xiying Liu, Malthusian stagnation is efficient
Martin Hellwig, Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity
Paula Onuchic, Informed intermediaries (Supplementary appendix)
Ran Eilat and Ady Pauzner, Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis, and Yiannis Vailakis, Sustainable debt
Daniel F. Garrett, Payoff implications of incentive contracting
Rumen Kostadinov, Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Battal Dogan and Lars Ehlers, Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Paulo Barelli and John Duggan, Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: dispensing with public randomization
Yaron Azrieli, Monitoring experts
Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz, and Xiaosheng Mu, Bayesian privacy
Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan, Robust group strategy-proofness
Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li, Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule
Anton Kolotilin and Hongyi Li, Relational communication
Karl H. Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Robust sequential search
Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, and Huaxia Zeng, Local global equivalence in voting models: a characterization and applications
Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli, and Amanda Friedenberg, The implications of finite-order reasoning
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov, Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman, Cooperative strategic games
Carolina Manzano and Xavier Vives, Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
Simon Loertscher and Claudio Mezzetti, A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
Sumeyra Akin, Matching with floor constraints
Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez, Approval voting without ballot restrictions
Narayana R. Kocherlakota, Bounds on price setting
Philip Marx and James Schummer, Revenue from matching platforms
Mihai Manea, Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries and competing paths of diffusion in networks (Supplementary appendix)
Alexey I. Kushnir and Lev V. Lokutsievskiy, When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
Yunan Li, Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Aurelien Baillon and Yan Xu, Simple bets to elicit private signals
Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck, Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
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论文出现
以下论文已被接受，并将在未来的问题上出现。下面的链接指向最终被接受的工作论文格式。论文将被复制和排版出版。
肖恩·霍兰和伊夫·斯普蒙特，两阶段多数主义选择
Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov和Andriy Zapechelnyuk，审查是最佳的说服方式
Efe A. Ok和Gerelt Tserenjigmid的《冷漠，犹豫不决，实验和随机选择
劳拉·多瓦尔，动态稳定匹配
Sebastian Gryglewicz和Aaron Kolb，随机利益下的动态信号
Teddy Mekonnen和René Leal Vizcaíno，贝叶斯比较静力学
Heiner Schumacher、Heidi Christina Thysen，《均衡契约与有限理性预期》(补充附录)
Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill，和William Phan，家庭关系:与兄弟姐妹的学校作业
查德·富尔顿，选择关注的对象
Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione，和Shengxing Zhang，均衡证券化与不同的信念
Afshin Nikzad，统一市场中的排序最优分配
Mehmet Ekmekci和Stephan Lauermann，泊松选举中的信息聚合
陈钊，伪贝叶斯更新
盖塔诺·安蒂诺菲，弗朗西斯卡·卡拉佩拉，弗朗西斯科·卡里，透明性与抵押品:中央清算与双边清算
William A. Branch, Bruce McGough, Mei Zhu，《统计太阳黑子》
Juan Carlos Cordoba和Xiying Liu，马尔萨斯的停滞是有效的
马丁·赫尔维格(Martin Hellwig)，大规模匿名人群中的不完全信息游戏
保拉·奥努奇，知情中介人(补充附录)
拉恩·埃拉特和阿迪·波兹纳，与仁慈的中间人进行双边贸易
Gaetano Bloise, Herakles Polemarchakis和Yiannis Vailakis，《可持续债务》
丹尼尔·f·加勒特，激励性合同的报酬含义
Rumen Kostadinov，作为隐性协议的一部分，重新谈判长期合同
巴特尔·多根和拉斯·埃勒斯，帕累托最少不稳定改进延迟接受
Paulo Barelli和John Duggan，几乎完全信息下的子博弈完美均衡:剔除公共随机化
亚伦·阿兹列里，监测专家
Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz，和xiao - sheng Mu，贝叶斯隐私
Steven Kivinen和Norovsambuu Tumennasan，鲁棒集团战略证明
Jaehong Kim和Mengling Li，血型障碍下捐献者优先原则的最优器官分配策略
Anton Kolotilin和Hongyi Li，关系沟通
Karl H. Schlag和Andriy Zapechelnyuk，鲁棒序列搜索
Ujjwal Kumar, Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav, Huaxia Zeng, Local global equivalence in voting models:表征与应用
Adam Brandenburger, Alexander Danieli和Amanda Friedenberg，有限阶推理的含义
Somouaoga Bonkoungou和Alexander Nesterov，比较学校选择和大学录取机制的战略可及性
埃隆·科尔伯格和亚伯拉罕·内曼，合作战略游戏
不对称可分割商品拍卖中的市场力量和福利
Simon Loertscher和Claudio Mezzetti，一个占主导地位的策略，基于估价的时钟拍卖
Sumeyra Akin，与地板约束匹配
Federica Ceron和Stéphane Gonzalez，不受投票限制的批准投票
Narayana R. Kocherlakota，价格设定的边界
Philip Marx和James Schummer，来自匹配平台的收入
Mihai Manea，网络中的瓶颈环节，必要的中介和扩散竞争路径(补充附录)
Alexey I. Kushnir和Lev V. Lokutsievskiy，什么时候单调函数是循环单调的?
具有财务约束的代理和昂贵验证的机制设计
Aurelien Baillon和Yan Xu，简单的打赌来引出私人信号
吉列尔梅·卡莫纳和康拉德·波德切克，大型有限参与者博弈的严格纯策略纳什均衡
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Articles
A model of weighted network formation
        Leonie Baumann        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
1–23
Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete-time markets
        David M. Kreps and Walter Schachermayer        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
25–47
A Maximum Likelihood Approach to Combining Forecasts
        Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
49–71
Convergence in models of misspecified learning
        Paul Heidhues, Botond Koszegi, and Philipp Strack        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
73–99
Voting in corporations
        Alan D. Miller        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
101–128
Testable forecasts
        Luciano Pomatto        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
129–160
Information aggregation in competitive markets
        Lucas Siga and Maximilian Mihm        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
161–196
Chain stability in trading networks
        Scott Duke Kominers, John William Hatfield, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
197–234
Agendas in legislative decision-making
        Sean Horan        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
235–274
Macro-financial volatility under dispersed information
        Jianjun Miao, Jieran Wu, and Eric R. Young        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX
275–315
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks
        Manuel Mueller-Frank and Claudia Neri        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
317–357

Theoretical Economics
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Home > Archives > Volume 16, Number 2 ( 2021)
Volume 16, Number 2 ( 2021)
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Table of contents
Articles
Bounded rationality and limited datasets
        Geoffroy de Clippel and Kareen Rozen        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
359–380
On selecting the right agent
        Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, and Kareen Rozen        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
381–402
Evolution, heritable risk and skewness loving
        Yuval Heller and Arthur J. Robson        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
SUPPLEMENTAL ZIP
403–424
Local agency costs of political centralization
        Roger B. Myerson        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
425–448
Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment
        Harry Pei        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
449–475
Costly miscalibration
        Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
477–506
Constrained preference elicitation
        Yaron Azrieli, Christopher P. Chambers, and Paul J. Healy        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
507–538
Random ambiguity
        Jay Lu        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
539–570
Delegating learning
        Juan F. Escobar and Qiaoxi Zhang        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
571–603
Communication with forgetful liars
        Philippe Jehiel        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
605–638
Sequential persuasion
        Fei Li and Peter Norman        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
639–675
The implementation of stabilization policy
        Olivier Loisel        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
677–716
Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes
        Ignacio Esponda and Demian Pouzo        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
717–757

Articles
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
        Mehmet Ekmekci and Stephan Lauermann        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
1–23
Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
        Afshin Nikzad        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
25–55
Informed intermediaries
        Paula Onuchic        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX
57–87
Family ties: school assignment with siblings
        Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, and William Phan        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
89–120
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs
        Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione, and Shengxing Zhang        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
121–152
Choosing what to pay attention to
        Chad Fulton        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
153–184
Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing
        Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesca Carapella, and Francesco Carli        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
185–217
Bayesian comparative statics
        Teddy Mekonnen and René Leal Vizcaíno        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
219–251
Pseudo-Bayesian updating
        Chen Zhao        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
253–289
Statistical sunspots
        William A. Branch, Bruce McGough, and Mei Zhu        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
291–329
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule
        Jaehong Kim and Mengling Li        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
331–369
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
        Heiner Schumacher and Heidi Christina Thysen        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
371–414
Malthusian stagnation is efficient
        Juan Carlos Cordoba and Xiying Liu        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
415–460
Incomplete-information games in large populations with anonymity
        Martin Hellwig        ABSTRACT  PRINT  VIEW
461–506