摘要翻译：
信令博弈中会出现哪些均衡取决于接收者如何解释偏离博弈路径的情况。我们为这些偏离路径信念建立了一个微观基础，并在一个模型中建立了一个相关的平衡细化，在这个模型中，平衡通过耐心和长寿的发送者和接收者群体的非平衡学习而产生。在我们的模型中，年轻的发送者对游戏的普遍分布不确定，所以他们合理地发送不平衡信号作为实验，以了解接收者群体的行为。不同类型的发送者的支付函数的差异产生了对这些实验的不同激励。利用Gittins指数(Gittins，1979)，我们描述了哪些发送者类型更经常地使用每一个信号，从而导致基于“类型兼容性”的对接收者偏离路径信念的约束，并因此产生了基于学习的均衡选择。
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英文标题：
《Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games》
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作者：
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where equilibrium arises through non-equilibrium learning by populations of patient and long-lived senders and receivers. In our model, young senders are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of play, so they rationally send out-of-equilibrium signals as experiments to learn about the behavior of the population of receivers. Differences in the payoff functions of the types of senders generate different incentives for these experiments. Using the Gittins index (Gittins, 1979), we characterize which sender types use each signal more often, leading to a constraint on the receiver's off-path beliefs based on "type compatibility" and hence a learning-based equilibrium selection.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.01819