摘要翻译：
两阶段电力市场出清是为了在理想条件下保持市场效率而设计的，如完美预测和非策略发电。研究表明，在两阶段结算电力市场中，非弹性负荷参与者的个体策略行为会降低效率。我们的分析进一步表明，虚拟投标可以通过缓解战略负荷参与者的市场势力来缓解这种效率损失。我们使用来自纽约ISO的真实市场数据来验证我们的理论。
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英文标题：
《The Role of Strategic Load Participants in Two-Stage Settlement
  Electricity Markets》
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作者：
Pengcheng You, Dennice F. Gayme, Enrique Mallada
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Mathematics        数学
二级分类：Optimization and Control        优化与控制
分类描述：Operations research, linear programming, control theory, systems theory, optimal control, game theory
运筹学，线性规划，控制论，系统论，最优控制，博弈论
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Two-stage electricity market clearing is designed to maintain market efficiency under ideal conditions, e.g., perfect forecast and nonstrategic generation. This work demonstrates that the individual strategic behavior of inelastic load participants in a two-stage settlement electricity market can deteriorate efficiency. Our analysis further implies that virtual bidding can play a role in alleviating this loss of efficiency by mitigating the market power of strategic load participants. We use real-world market data from New York ISO to validate our theory.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.08341