摘要翻译：
在连续时间条件下，风险厌恶代理控制布朗运动驱动的输出过程的漂移，最优契约在终端输出中是线性的；这一结果在道德风险和更强的假设下逆向选择的环境中是众所周知的。我们表明，当另外保留实用程序是类型相关的时，这个结果仍然成立。这类问题发生在涉及竞争校长的最优薪酬问题的研究中。
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英文标题：
《Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse
  selection and moral hazard are present》
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作者：
N. Packham
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Portfolio Management        项目组合管理
分类描述：Security selection and optimization, capital allocation, investment strategies and performance measurement
证券选择与优化、资本配置、投资策略与绩效评价
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and -under stronger assumptions - adverse selection. We show that this result continues to hold when in addition reservation utilities are type-dependent. This type of problem occurs in the study of optimal compensation problems involving competing principals.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04080