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2022-03-06
摘要翻译:
我们描述了认知博弈论中三个相互关联的概念:允许性、适当合理性和迭代允许性。定义了不完全信息博弈的词典认知模型。在此基础上,我们给出了两组刻划。第一组特征是允许性和适当的合理性。第二组以另一种方式描述允许性,并迭代允许性。在每一组中,后者的条件都强于前者,这就对应于这样一个事实,即适当的合理性和迭代的可容许性是完全信息框架内允许性的两个(相容的)改进。这两类人的内在差异是理性的作用:第一类人不需要理性,而第二类人需要理性。
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英文标题:
《Characterizing Permissibility, Proper Rationalizability, and Iterated
  Admissibility by Incomplete Information》
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作者:
Shuige Liu
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最新提交年份:
2018
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分类信息:

一级分类:Economics        经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
  We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory: permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexicographic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based on it, we give two groups of characterizations. The first group characterizes permissibility and proper rationalizability. The second group characterizes permissibility in an alternative way and iterated admissibility. In each group, the conditions for the latter are stronger than those for the former, which corresponds to the fact that proper rationalizability and iterated admissibility are two (compatible) refinements of permissibility within the complete information framework. The intrinsic difference between the two groups are the role of rationality: the first group does not need it, while the second group does.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.01933
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