摘要翻译：
稳定的婚姻问题是一个众所周知的男女配对问题，使没有结婚的男女双方都更喜欢对方。这样的问题有广泛的实际应用，从匹配住院医生到医院，到匹配学生到学校。解决这个问题的一个著名算法是Gale-Shapley算法，它运行在多项式时间内。事实证明，稳定的婚姻程序总是可以被操纵的。虽然Gale-Shapley算法在计算上易于操作，但我们证明了存在稳定的NP难操作的婚姻过程。我们还考虑了投票理论与稳定婚姻程序之间的关系，表明NP难操纵的投票规则可以用来定义NP难操纵的稳定婚姻程序。最后，我们考虑了像Gale-Shapley这样的稳定婚姻程序偏向于一种性别而不是另一种性别的问题，并展示了如何使用投票规则来使任何稳定婚姻程序都不带性别色彩。
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英文标题：
《Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures》
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作者：
Maria Pini, Francesca Rossi, Brent Venable and Toby Walsh
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最新提交年份：
2009
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Artificial Intelligence        人工智能
分类描述：Covers all areas of AI except Vision, Robotics, Machine Learning, Multiagent Systems, and Computation and Language (Natural Language Processing), which have separate subject areas. In particular, includes Expert Systems, Theorem Proving (although this may overlap with Logic in Computer Science), Knowledge Representation, Planning, and Uncertainty in AI. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes I.2.0, I.2.1, I.2.3, I.2.4, I.2.8, and I.2.11.
涵盖了人工智能的所有领域，除了视觉、机器人、机器学习、多智能体系统以及计算和语言（自然语言处理），这些领域有独立的学科领域。特别地，包括专家系统，定理证明（尽管这可能与计算机科学中的逻辑重叠），知识表示，规划，和人工智能中的不确定性。大致包括ACM学科类I.2.0、I.2.1、I.2.3、I.2.4、I.2.8和I.2.11中的材料。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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英文摘要：
  The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in polynomial time.   It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley favour one gender over the other, and we show how to use voting rules to make any stable marriage procedure gender neutral.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/0909.4437