摘要翻译：
我们提出了一个慈善或公共资助种子的设计，以允许（接近）最优地提供一个分散的、自组织的公共产品生态系统。这一概念将思想从二次投票扩展到内生社区形成的筹资机制。个人为对他们有价值的项目做出公共产品贡献。项目收到的金额（与）收到的捐款平方根之和的平方成正比。在“标准模型”下，这产生了第一个最佳的公共产品提供。变化可以限制成本，帮助防止串通和帮助协调。我们将讨论竞选融资、开放源码软件生态系统、新闻媒体融资和城市公共项目的应用。更广泛地说，我们通过提供中立和非独裁的规则来解决政治哲学中经典的自由主义-社群主义辩论，尽管这些规则支持集体组织。
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英文标题：
《A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods》
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作者：
Vitalik Buterin, Zoe Hitzig, E. Glen Weyl
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from Quadratic Voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Individuals make public goods contributions to projects of value to them. The amount received by the project is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the "standard model" this yields first best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect against collusion and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign finance, open source software ecosystems, news media finance and urban public projects. More broadly, we offer a resolution to the classic liberal-communitarian debate in political philosophy by providing neutral and non-authoritarian rules that nonetheless support collective organization.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.06421