摘要翻译：
我们研究了加纳医疗保险补贴的长期选择和治疗效果，那里的规定是不可执行的。我们随机提供不同水平的补贴(1/3、2/3和全额），并在最初干预后7个月和3年进行跟踪调查。我们发现，一次性补贴促进和维持了所有治疗组的保险参保，但长期医疗服务利用只增加了部分补贴组。我们发现选择解释了这一模式：那些因补贴特别是部分补贴而注册的人患病更多，医疗保健利用更高。
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英文标题：
《Long-run Consequences of Health Insurance Promotion When Mandates are
  Not Enforceable: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ghana》
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作者：
Patrick Asuming, Hyuncheol Bryant Kim, and Armand Sim
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  We study long-run selection and treatment effects of a health insurance subsidy in Ghana, where mandates are not enforceable. We randomly provide different levels of subsidy (1/3, 2/3, and full), with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. We find that a one-time subsidy promotes and sustains insurance enrollment for all treatment groups, but long-run health care service utilization increases only for the partial subsidy groups. We find evidence that selection explains this pattern: those who were enrolled due to the subsidy, especially the partial subsidy, are more ill and have greater health care utilization.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.09004