摘要翻译：
积极的激励方案允许个人在未能达到健康目标时对自己施加经济惩罚，为鼓励更健康的行为提供了一种有希望的方法。然而，这些计划中固有的选择因素引起了人们的担忧，即只有人口中的非代表性部门才会选择积极的激励措施，为那些不选择的人留下了价值。在对佩戴Fitbit活动追踪器的人进行的为期29周的实地实验中，我们发现那些提供积极激励选择的人体力活动的增加是适度的和短暂的。相反，我们发现那些被分配给（通常违背他们陈述的偏好）同样积极激励的人显著而持续的增长。对那些提供选择的人来说，好处不大似乎是因为那些从积极激励措施中受益最大的人最不可能选择这些措施，而选择加入的是那些不需要这些措施的人。这些结果在后续的实验室实验中得到了证实。我们还发现，如果分配给积极激励的个人也在Fitbit移动应用程序中更新了他们的步骤目标，以匹配我们提供给他们的新活动目标，他们的好处就会明显。我们的发现对基于激励的干预措施以改善健康行为有重要的意义。对于企业和政策制定者来说，我们的结果表明，鼓励持续健康行为的一个有效策略是将积极激励方案的暴露与技术决策辅助结合起来，以帮助个人在激励结束后保持这种行为。
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英文标题：
《Aggressive Economic Incentives and Physical Activity: The Role of Choice
  and Technology Decision Aids》
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作者：
Idris Adjerid, Rachael Purta, Aaron Striegel, George Loewenstein
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  Aggressive incentive schemes that allow individuals to impose economic punishment on themselves if they fail to meet health goals present a promising approach for encouraging healthier behavior. However, the element of choice inherent in these schemes introduces concerns that only non-representative sectors of the population will select aggressive incentives, leaving value on the table for those who don't opt in. In a field experiment conducted over a 29 week period on individuals wearing Fitbit activity trackers, we find modest and short lived increases in physical activity for those provided the choice of aggressive incentives. In contrast, we find significant and persistent increases for those assigned (oftentimes against their stated preference) to the same aggressive incentives. The modest benefits for those provided a choice seems to emerge because those who benefited most from the aggressive incentives were the least likely to choose them, and it was those who did not need them who opted in. These results are confirmed in a follow up lab experiment. We also find that benefits to individuals assigned to aggressive incentives were pronounced if they also updated their step target in the Fitbit mobile application to match the new activity goal we provided them. Our findings have important implications for incentive based interventions to improve health behavior. For firms and policy makers, our results suggest that one effective strategy for encouraging sustained healthy behavior combines exposure to aggressive incentive schemes to jolt individuals out of their comfort zones with technology decision aids that help individuals sustain this behavior after incentives end.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.06698