摘要翻译：
在投票理论中，贿赂是一种操纵行为，外部行为者（行贿人）向选民支付改变投票的费用，以使她喜欢的候选人当选。我们研究了一个贿赂模型，在这个模型中，每一张选票的价格取决于选民被要求实施的变革的数量。具体地说，在我们的模型中，行贿者可以通过支付一系列连续候选人的交换来改变选民的偏好列表。每种互换可能有不同的价格；贿赂的价格是它所涉及的所有掉期价格的总和。我们证明了这个模型的复杂性结果，我们称之为交换贿赂，对于一个广泛的选举系统，包括批准和K-批准的变体，Borda，Copeland和Maximin。
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英文标题：
《Swap Bribery》
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作者：
E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko
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最新提交年份：
2009
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Artificial Intelligence        人工智能
分类描述：Covers all areas of AI except Vision, Robotics, Machine Learning, Multiagent Systems, and Computation and Language (Natural Language Processing), which have separate subject areas. In particular, includes Expert Systems, Theorem Proving (although this may overlap with Logic in Computer Science), Knowledge Representation, Planning, and Uncertainty in AI. Roughly includes material in ACM Subject Classes I.2.0, I.2.1, I.2.3, I.2.4, I.2.8, and I.2.11.
涵盖了人工智能的所有领域，除了视觉、机器人、机器学习、多智能体系统以及计算和语言（自然语言处理），这些领域有独立的学科领域。特别地，包括专家系统，定理证明（尽管这可能与计算机科学中的逻辑重叠），知识表示，规划，和人工智能中的不确定性。大致包括ACM学科类I.2.0、I.2.1、I.2.3、I.2.4、I.2.8和I.2.11中的材料。
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英文摘要：
  In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is asked to implement. Specifically, in our model the briber can change a voter's preference list by paying for a sequence of swaps of consecutive candidates. Each swap may have a different price; the price of a bribery is the sum of the prices of all swaps that it involves. We prove complexity results for this model, which we call swap bribery, for a broad class of election systems, including variants of approval and k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and maximin.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/0905.3885