摘要翻译：
委托人可以限制代理人的信息（说服问题）或限制代理人的自由裁量权（委托问题）。我们证明了这些问题一般是等价的--解一个解另一个。我们利用说服文献中的工具来推广和推广委托代理文献中的许多结果，以及解决新的委托代理问题，如带有参与约束的垄断规制。
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英文标题：
《Persuasion Meets Delegation》
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作者：
Anton Kolotilin and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or restrict an agent's discretion (the delegation problem). We show that these problems are generally equivalent - solving one solves the other. We use tools from the persuasion literature to generalize and extend many results in the delegation literature, as well as to address novel delegation problems, such as monopoly regulation with a participation constraint.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.02628