摘要翻译：
个人福利的广义概念实际上是一系列相关的具体概念，它们彼此具有“家庭相似性”。人们可能会关心一项政策将如何影响人们的主观偏好和客观利益的一些概念。本文从福利标准的角度提供了一个政策评估框架，该框架结合了这两方面的考虑。为这样一个标准提供了充分的条件，使其隐含着与帕累托的一致标准相同的社会状态排序。通过研究具有相互依赖序数偏好的Agent群体，证明了充分性。
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英文标题：
《J. S. Mill's Liberal Principle and Unanimity》
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作者：
Edward J. Green
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  The broad concept of an individual's welfare is actually a cluster of related specific concepts that bear a "family resemblance" to one another. One might care about how a policy will affect people both in terms of their subjective preferences and also in terms of some notion of their objective interests. This paper provides a framework for evaluation of policies in terms of welfare criteria that combine these two considerations. Sufficient conditions are provided for such a criterion to imply the same ranking of social states as does Pareto's unanimity criterion. Sufficiency is proved via study of a community of agents with interdependent ordinal preferences.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.07769