摘要翻译：
尽管使用稳定机制的双边匹配市场的整合产生了整合的预期收益，但我表明，在最坏的情况下，这些收益是负面的。在任何稳定的匹配机制中，整合的损失可能足够大，以至于代理人配偶的平均等级降低了他们偏好列表长度的37.5%。
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英文标题：
《The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large》
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作者：
Josu\'e Ortega
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.10287