摘要翻译：
Kasher和Rubinstein(1997)提出了根据潜在成员的意见对群体成员进行分类的问题。这涉及到一个有限的Agent集合$n=\1,2,\ldots,n}$，每个Agent都有一个关于哪些Agent应该被归类为属于特定子群J的意见。集体身份函数(CIF)聚合这些意见，产生被认为是$J$的成员类别。Kasher和Rubinstein公设公理，旨在确保公平和社会期望的结果，特征不同的CIFS。我们跟随他们的领导，用其他公理取代他们的自由公理，限制代理人的影响范围。我们发现其中一些会导致不同的CIFs，而在另一个例子中，我们发现了一个不可能的结果。
---
英文标题：
《Alternative Axioms in Group Identification Problems》
---
作者：
Federico Fioravanti and Fernando Tohm\'e
---
最新提交年份：
2019
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--

---
英文摘要：
  Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) introduced the problem of classifying the members of a group in terms of the opinions of their potential members. This involves a finite set of agents $N = \{1,2,\ldots,n\}$, each one having an opinion about which agents should be classified as belonging to a specific subgroup J. A Collective Identity Function (CIF) aggregates those opinions yielding the class of members deemed $J$. Kasher and Rubinstein postulate axioms, intended to ensure fair and socially desirable outcomes, characterizing different CIFs. We follow their lead by replacing their liberal axiom by other axioms, constraining the spheres of influence of the agents. We show that some of them lead to different CIFs while in another instance we find an impossibility result.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.05961