摘要翻译：
证据游戏研究发送者通过有选择地披露关于未知世界状态的确凿证据来说服接收者的情况。证据博弈往往有多重均衡。哈特等人。（2017）提出关注真理倾向均衡，即完美贝叶斯均衡，即发送方在无动于衷时更愿意如实披露，而接收方在表面上采取偏离路径的披露。它们表明，真理倾向均衡是一个扰动博弈的均衡，在这个博弈中，发送者因说真话而获得无限小的报酬。我们证明了当接收者的作用空间有限时，求真均衡可能不存在，也不等价于摄动博弈的均衡。为了恢复存在性，我们引入了一个关于接收者收益的小不确定性的扰动对策。一个可净化的均衡是在一个无限扰动的博弈中的一个倾向于真理的均衡。它的存在和特征是一个简单的表征。一个也是可净化的、倾向真理的均衡是一个扰动博弈的均衡。
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英文标题：
《Equilibrium Refinement in Finite Evidence Games》
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作者：
Shaofei Jiang
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on truth-leaning equilibria, i.e., perfect Bayesian equilibria where the sender prefers disclosing truthfully when indifferent, and the receiver takes off-path disclosure at face value. They show that a truth-leaning equilibrium is an equilibrium of a perturbed game where the sender has an infinitesimal reward for truth-telling. We show that, when the receiver's action space is finite, truth-leaning equilibrium may fail to exist, and it is not equivalent to equilibrium of the perturbed game. To restore existence, we introduce a disturbed game with a small uncertainty about the receiver's payoff. A purifiable equilibrium is a truth-leaning equilibrium in an infinitesimally disturbed game. It exists and features a simple characterization. A truth-leaning equilibrium that is also purifiable is an equilibrium of the perturbed game.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2007.06403