摘要翻译：
我研究了一个病人发送者和一系列接收者之间的重复沟通游戏。发送者有关于他撒谎的心理代价的持续的私人信息，并且在每个时期，可以私下观察一个I.I.D.的实现。通信发生前的状态。我描述了每种类型的发送者的最高均衡收益。当支持接收者先前信念的最大说谎成本接近发送者的说谎收益时，重复沟通博弈中每种类型的最大均衡收益收敛于一次贝叶斯说服博弈中每种类型的均衡收益。我还表明，在每一个发送者--最优均衡中，没有哪种发送者在每一个历史上都在说实话和撒谎之间混为一谈。当存在道德类型的说谎成本大于其收益时，我给出了所有非道德类型的发送者达到其最优承诺收益的充要条件。我发现了一种外部选择效应，通过这种效应，道德的可能性降低了每一种非道德类型的回报。
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英文标题：
《Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost》
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作者：
Harry Pei
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an i.i.d. state before communication takes place. I characterize every type of sender's highest equilibrium payoff. When the highest lying cost in the support of the receivers' prior belief approaches the sender's benefit from lying, every type's highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated communication game converges to his equilibrium payoff in a one-shot Bayesian persuasion game. I also show that in every sender-optimal equilibrium, no type of sender mixes between telling the truth and lying at every history. When there exist ethical types whose lying costs outweigh their benefits, I provide necessary and sufficient conditions for all non-ethical type senders to attain their optimal commitment payoffs. I identify an outside option effect through which the possibility of being ethical decreases every non-ethical type's payoff.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.08069