摘要翻译：
研究了动态环境下两个出价人的二次价格拍卖中的合谋行为。一个投标人可以向对手提出要么接受要么放弃的合谋建议，包括要约和索贿。我们证明了在共谋成功概率为1的情况下，总是存在一个鲁棒均衡。在均衡中，对于每种类型的发起者，期望收益通常高于单期权模型(ES\“{o}和Schummer(2004))的任何稳健均衡和我们模型中的任何其他分离均衡的对应方。
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英文标题：
《Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request》
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作者：
Jingfeng Lu, Zongwei Lu, Christian Riis
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that there always exists a robust equilibrium in which the collusion success probability is one. In the equilibrium, for each type of initiator the expected payoff is generally higher than the counterpart in any robust equilibria of the single-option model (Es\"{o} and Schummer (2004)) and any other separating equilibria in our model.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.03607