摘要翻译：
我们考虑了一个对称的两人竞赛，其中努力的选择集是有约束的。我们应用支付函数的一个基本性质来证明，在标准假设下，纯策略中存在唯一的纳什均衡。证明了所有平衡点都在无约束平衡点附近。也许令人惊讶的是，当玩家有不同的奖品评价时，情况并非如此。
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英文标题：
《A note on contests with a constrained choice set of effort》
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作者：
Doron Klunover and John Morgan
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.04436