摘要翻译：
我们定义并研究了机制的一个特性，我们称之为“战略简单性”，这是为了抓住这样一个观点，即在战略简单的机制中，战略选择需要有限的战略复杂性。我们定义了一个策略简单的机制，如果选择可以基于对其他Agent偏好的一阶信念和对其他Agent理性的一阶确定性，并且Agent不需要形成高阶信念，因为这种信念与最优策略无关。所有的主导战略机制在战略上都是简单的。但更多的机制在战略上是简单的。特别是，在双边贸易问题和投票问题上，简单的战略机制可能比主导战略机制更灵活。
---
英文标题：
《Strategically Simple Mechanisms》
---
作者：
Tilman Borgers and Jiangtao Li
---
最新提交年份：
2018
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--

---
英文摘要：
  We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.00849