摘要翻译：
对相同的工人实施监督和激励过程可能会导致工资差异，这源于雇主和员工的优化。越难评估劳动产出的性质，这样一个过程就越重要，这样一个过程对工资发展增长的影响也就越重要。本文提出的动态模型表明，雇主会选择向工人支付低于他应得的起始工资，从而产生符合人力资本文献中经典轮廓的工资轮廓。随着技术进步，工资分布和工资差异增加，随着年长工人被年轻工人取代，由于前者的相对边际成本增加，导致更替率增加。
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英文标题：
《The Impact of Supervision and Incentive Process in Explaining Wage
  Profile and Variance》
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作者：
Nitsa Kasir (Kaliner) and Idit Sohlberg
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最新提交年份：
2018
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Econometrics        计量经济学
分类描述：Econometric Theory, Micro-Econometrics, Macro-Econometrics, Empirical Content of Economic Relations discovered via New Methods, Methodological Aspects of the Application of Statistical Inference to Economic Data.
计量经济学理论，微观计量经济学，宏观计量经济学，通过新方法发现的经济关系的实证内容，统计推论应用于经济数据的方法论方面。
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英文摘要：
  The implementation of a supervision and incentive process for identical workers may lead to wage variance that stems from employer and employee optimization. The harder it is to assess the nature of the labor output, the more important such a process becomes, and the influence of such a process on wage development growth. The dynamic model presented in this paper shows that an employer will choose to pay a worker a starting wage that is less than what he deserves, resulting in a wage profile that fits the classic profile in the human-capital literature. The wage profile and wage variance rise at times of technological advancements, which leads to increased turnover as older workers are replaced by younger workers due to a rise in the relative marginal cost of the former.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.01332