摘要翻译：
在划分模型的基础上，考虑了范式合作博弈的中间核心，并在不完全信息下进行了经济交换。我们开发了一个解决方案概念，我们可以大致位于Wilson的粗核和Yannelis的私有核之间。我们研究了合同的临时谈判，并解决了合同交付的两种情况：临时和事后。我们的解决方案不同于Wilson的概念，因为在我们的解决方案中策略的可测量性被推迟到消费日期（假设在消费日期玩家将知道的信息）。对于中间消费，我们的概念不同于Yannelis的私有核心，因为玩家可以在我们的解决方案中以适当的公共知识事件为条件进行谈判，这加强了游戏的中间方面，正如我们将举例说明的那样。
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英文标题：
《An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with
  incomplete information: a correction》
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作者：
Youcef Askoura
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We consider the interim core of normal form cooperative games and exchange economies with incomplete information based on the partition model. We develop a solution concept that we can situate roughly between Wilson's coarse core and Yannelis's private core. We investigate the interim negotiation of contracts and address the two situations of contract delivery: interim and ex post. Our solution differs from Wilson's concept because the measurability of strategies in our solution is postponed until the consumption date (assumed with respect to the information that will be known by the players at the consumption date). For interim consumption, our concept differs from Yannelis's private core because players can negotiate conditional on proper common knowledge events in our solution, which strengthens the interim aspect of the game, as we will illustrate with examples.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1903.09867