摘要翻译：
内容提供商和互联网服务提供商之间的收入分享合同可以作为加强互联网基础设施的杠杆。如果ISP和CPS之间谈判了有吸引力的合同，可以激励ISP投资于网络基础设施，以提高用户的服务质量（QoS）。这里的想法是，CPs获得的净利润的一部分给ISP投资网络。道德风险经济学框架被用来模拟这样一种互动，在这种互动中，委托人决定一个契约，代理人通过调整她的努力来做出反应。在我们的环境中，几个竞争的CPs通过一个共同的ISP进行交互。研究了两种情况：（一）ISP在CPs之间进行区分，并做出（潜在的）不同的投资来改善每个CP的QoS；（二）ISP不在CPs之间进行区分，并为两者做出共同的投资。最后一种情况可以看作是ISP方面的\emph{网络中立行为}。我们分析了最优合约，发现能够更好地货币化其需求的CP总是更倾向于非中性制度。有趣的是，ISP的收入，以及社会效用，也被发现在非中立制度下更高。
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英文标题：
《Revenue Sharing in the Internet: A Moral Hazard Approach and a
  Net-neutrality Perspective》
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作者：
Fehmina Malik and Manjesh K.~Hanawal and Yezekael Hayel and
  Jayakrishnan Nair
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  Revenue sharing contracts between Content Providers (CPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can act as leverage for enhancing the infrastructure of the Internet. ISPs can be incentivized to make investments in network infrastructure that improve Quality of Service (QoS) for users if attractive contracts are negotiated between them and CPs. The idea here is that part of the net profit gained by CPs are given to ISPs to invest in the network. The Moral Hazard economic framework is used to model such an interaction, in which a principal determines a contract, and an agent reacts by adapting her effort. In our setting, several competitive CPs interact through one common ISP. Two cases are studied: (i) the ISP differentiates between the CPs and makes a (potentially) different investment to improve the QoS of each CP, and (ii) the ISP does not differentiate between CPs and makes a common investment for both. The last scenario can be viewed as \emph{network neutral behavior} on the part of the ISP. We analyse the optimal contracts and show that the CP that can better monetize its demand always prefers the non-neutral regime. Interestingly, ISP revenue, as well as social utility, are also found to be higher under the non-neutral regime.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.09580