摘要翻译：
企业战略性地披露产品信息以吸引消费者，但接受者往往发现处理所有信息的成本很高，尤其是当产品具有复杂的特征时。我们研究了两个发送者的竞争信息披露模型，其中接收者可能会篡改每个发送者的实验，但篡改的信息成本会增加。对于一大类参数，发送者提供接收者第一个最佳水平的信息是一种平衡--即如果她自己控制信息提供，她会学到的尽可能多的信息。一个发送者的信息取代了另一个发送者的信息，这就抵消了单方面提供较少信息的盈利能力。因此，我们提供了一个新的渠道，通过有注意力成本的竞争鼓励信息披露。
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英文标题：
《Competing to Persuade a Rationally Inattentive Agent》
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作者：
Vasudha Jain and Mark Whitmeyer
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure by two senders, in which the receiver may garble each sender's experiment, subject to a cost increasing in the informativeness of the garbling. For a large class of parameters, it is an equilibrium for the senders to provide the receiver's first best level of information - i.e. as much as she would learn if she herself controlled information provision. Information on one sender substitutes for information on the other, which nullifies the profitability of a unilateral provision of less information. Thus, we provide a novel channel through which competition with attention costs encourages information disclosure.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.09255