摘要翻译：
我们考虑一种环境，玩家需要决定是否购买某种产品（或采用某种技术）。产品是好是坏，但它的真正价值并不为玩家所知。相反，每个玩家都有自己关于其质量的私人信息。每个玩家可以观察其他玩家之前的动作，估计产品的质量。文献中的一个经典结果表明，在类似的设置中，当整个网络的学习停止时，信息级联就会发生，玩家重复他们前人的行为。与现有的关于信息级联的文献相比，在本作品中，玩家获得了不止一次的行动机会。在每个回合中，玩家被统一随机选择，可以决定购买产品并离开市场或等待。通过一个维度仅随玩家数量二次增长的不动点方程，给出了具有前瞻性策略的结构化完美贝叶斯均衡(SBBE)的刻画。特别地，在每个时间实例中，玩家策略的充分状态是一对两个整数，第一个整数对应于商品的估计质量，第二个整数指示不能向其余玩家提供关于商品的附加信息的玩家数量。基于这一特征，我们研究了两种情况下的信息级联。首先，我们证明了当折扣因子严格小于1时，信息级联随着参与者数量的增加而发生的概率很高。此外，在级联发生之前，只有系统中全部信息的一小部分被揭示出来。其次，更令人惊讶的是，我们表明，对于固定数量的参与者，当折扣因子接近1时，当产品是坏的时，坏的信息级联是良性的，当折扣因子等于1时，坏的信息级联完全消除。
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英文标题：
《Do Informational Cascades Happen with Non-myopic Agents?》
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作者：
Ilai Bistritz, Nasimeh Heydaribeni and Achilleas Anastasopoulos
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：General Economics        一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance        数量金融学
二级分类：Economics        经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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英文摘要：
  We consider an environment where players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a technology) or not. The product is either good or bad but its true value is not known to the players. Instead, each player has her own private information on its quality. Each player can observe the previous actions of other players and estimate the quality of the product. A classic result in the literature shows that in similar settings information cascades occur where learning stops for the whole network and players repeat the actions of their predecessors. In contrast to the existing literature on informational cascades, in this work, players get more than one opportunity to act. In each turn, a player is chosen uniformly at random and can decide to buy the product and leave the market or to wait. We provide a characterization of structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (sPBE) with forward-looking strategies through a fixed-point equation of dimensionality that grows only quadratically with the number of players. In particular, a sufficient state for players' strategies at each time instance is a pair of two integers, the first corresponding to the estimated quality of the good and the second indicating the number of players that cannot offer additional information about the good to the rest of the players. Based on this characterization we study informational cascades in two regimes. First, we show that for a discount factor strictly smaller than one, informational cascades happen with high probability as the number of players increases. Furthermore, only a small portion of the total information in the system is revealed before a cascade occurs. Secondly, and more surprisingly, we show that for a fixed number of players, as the discount factor approaches one, bad informational cascades are benign when the product is bad, and are completely eliminated when the discount factor equals one.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.01327