摘要翻译：
隐私问题的核心是企业可能会利用消费者数据进行价格歧视。一个常见的政策反应是，应该让消费者控制哪些公司访问他们的数据以及如何访问他们的数据。由于企业基于所看到的数据和消费者的披露选择来了解消费者的偏好，消费者控制的均衡含义尚不清楚。我们研究了在垄断和竞争市场中，这些措施是否改善了消费者福利。我们发现，相对于完全价格歧视和没有个性化定价，消费者控制可以提高消费者福利。首先，消费者可以利用信息披露来增强竞争力量。第二，消费者可以披露信息，甚至诱使垄断者降低价格。消费者控制是否提高福利取决于披露技术和市场竞争力。在竞争激烈的市场中，简单的披露技术就足够了。当面对垄断者时，消费者需要部分披露的可能性来获得任何福利收益。
---
英文标题：
《Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing》
---
作者：
S. Nageeb Ali, Greg Lewis, Shoshana Vasserman
---
最新提交年份：
2020
---
分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--

---
英文摘要：
  Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access their data and how. Since firms learn about a consumer's preferences based on the data seen and the consumer's disclosure choices, the equilibrium implications of consumer control are unclear. We study whether such measures improve consumer welfare in monopolistic and competitive markets. We find that consumer control can improve consumer welfare relative to both perfect price discrimination and no personalized pricing. First, consumers can use disclosure to amplify competitive forces. Second, consumers can disclose information to induce even a monopolist to lower prices. Whether consumer control improves welfare depends on the disclosure technology and market competitiveness. Simple disclosure technologies suffice in competitive markets. When facing a monopolist, a consumer needs partial disclosure possibilities to obtain any welfare gains.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.04774