摘要翻译：
我们研究了具有易匹配代理和难匹配代理的交易市场中的动态匹配。贪婪策略试图在到达时匹配代理，忽略了等待代理通过促进未来匹配而产生的正外部性。我们证明，在“更厚”的市场和更快的匹配之间的这种权衡在大市场中消失了；贪婪策略比任何其他策略导致更短的等待时间和更多的代理匹配。我们从国家肾脏登记处的数据中实证地证实了这些发现。贪婪匹配实现了与常用策略一样多的移植（比每月批处理多1.6%)，并且缩短了患者等待时间。
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英文标题：
《Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets》
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作者：
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Philipp Strack
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings. We prove that this trade-off between a ``thicker'' market and faster matching vanishes in large markets; A greedy policy leads to shorter waiting times, and more agents matched than any other policy. We empirically confirm these findings in data from the National Kidney Registry. Greedy matching achieves as many transplants as commonly-used policies (1.6\% more than monthly-batching), and shorter patient waiting times.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.06824