摘要翻译：
本文综述了在链接形成中相互同意假设下的网络形成的博弈论模型的文献。在链路形成中引入同意，给网络形成过程带来了一个协调问题。本调查探讨了从这一理论中得出的结论和避免主要陷阱的各种方法。主要观点来源于Myerson关于链路形成中的相互同意的研究，以及他的主要结论，即在相互同意和正链路形成成本下，任何网络形成的博弈论模型中，空网络（没有任何链路的网络）总是呈现为强纳什均衡。杰克逊和沃林斯基引入了一个合作框架来避免这一主要陷阱。他们设计了成对稳定网络的概念，以达到主要是非平凡的平衡网络。不幸的是，这种成对稳定性的概念需要在链接形成过程中由成对的决策者协调行动。通过探索标准纳什均衡概念的潜在改进来解释非平凡网络的出现，我审视了在相互同意下的纯粹非合作网络形成框架中的可能解决方案。这包括单方面和一元稳定的概念。第一种是建立在个人对他人如何回应自己修改网络的努力的高级理性推理的基础上的。后者将信任、有界的理性行为纳入网络形成过程。最后，本文初步探讨了外部关联机制作为解决网络形成中相互同意问题的替代框架。
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英文标题：
《Building social networks under consent: A survey》
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作者：
Robert P. Gilles
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Physics        物理学
二级分类：Physics and Society        物理学与社会
分类描述：Structure, dynamics and collective behavior of societies and groups (human or otherwise). Quantitative analysis of social networks and other complex networks. Physics and engineering of infrastructure and systems of broad societal impact (e.g., energy grids, transportation networks).
社会和团体（人类或其他）的结构、动态和集体行为。社会网络和其他复杂网络的定量分析。具有广泛社会影响的基础设施和系统（如能源网、运输网络）的物理和工程。
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英文摘要：
  This survey explores the literature on game-theoretic models of network formation under the hypothesis of mutual consent in link formation. The introduction of consent in link formation imposes a coordination problem in the network formation process. This survey explores the conclusions from this theory and the various methodologies to avoid the main pitfalls. The main insight originates from Myerson's work on mutual consent in link formation and his main conclusion that the empty network (the network without any links) always emerges as a strong Nash equilibrium in any game-theoretic model of network formation under mutual consent and positive link formation costs. Jackson and Wolinsky introduced a cooperative framework to avoid this main pitfall. They devised the notion of a pairwise stable network to arrive at equilibrium networks that are mainly non-trivial. Unfortunately, this notion of pairwise stability requires coordinated action by pairs of decision makers in link formation. I survey the possible solutions in a purely non-cooperative framework of network formation under mutual consent by exploring potential refinements of the standard Nash equilibrium concept to explain the emergence of non-trivial networks. This includes the notions of unilateral and monadic stability. The first one is founded on advanced rational reasoning of individuals about how others would respond to one's efforts to modify the network. The latter incorporates trusting, boundedly rational behaviour into the network formation process. The survey is concluded with an initial exploration of external correlation devices as an alternative framework to address mutual consent in network formation.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.11693