摘要翻译：
通过社交网络拍卖，由李等人首创。(2017)，在拍卖机制设计的文献中一直备受关注。然而，对于多单位的单位需求拍卖，除了一些幼稚的机制外，还没有一个机制能够满足策略证明性、无赤字性、无浪费性和个体理性的要求。在本文中，我们首先提出了一种满足上述所有性质的机制。然后，我们对两种朴素的机制进行了全面的比较，表明所提出的机制在社会剩余、卖方收入和买方说实话的激励方面占主导地位。我们还分析了该机制所实现的社会剩余和收益的特征，包括最坏情况下效率损失的恒定逼近性和从卖方角度优化收益的复杂性。
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英文标题：
《Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network》
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作者：
Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanael Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, and
  Makoto Yokoo
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最新提交年份：
2019
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分类信息：

一级分类：Computer Science        计算机科学
二级分类：Computer Science and Game Theory        计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述：Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面，包括机制设计的工作，游戏中的学习（可能与学习重叠），游戏中的agent建模的基础（可能与多agent系统重叠），非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-wastefulness, and individual rationality for the multi-unit unit-demand auction, except for some naive ones. In this paper, we first propose a mechanism that satisfies all the above properties. We then make a comprehensive comparison with two naive mechanisms, showing that the proposed mechanism dominates them in social surplus, seller's revenue, and incentive of buyers for truth-telling. We also analyze the characteristics of the social surplus and the revenue achieved by the proposed mechanism, including the constant approximability of the worst-case efficiency loss and the complexity of optimizing revenue from the seller's perspective.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.08809