摘要翻译：
在拍卖中，每一方都出价一定的金额，出价最高的一方为获胜者。有趣的是，拍卖也可以作为其他现实世界系统的模型。在全薪拍卖中，所有各方都必须为竞标支付罚金。在最普遍研究的所有薪酬拍卖中，政党放弃他们的全部投标，这被认为是政治竞选支出的一个模式。在这里，我们考虑了一些可供选择的罚金，这些罚金可能被用作不同现实世界竞争的模型，例如准备国防或基础设施合同的投标。
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英文标题：
《All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits》
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作者：
Benjamin Kang and James Unwin
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics        经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics        理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
  In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here we consider a number of alternative forfeits which might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.02599